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1. The Undeclared War
The war this book is about is a world war on the economic
front. While the great powers are arming themselves for
a future war of bullets and bombs, they are already engaged
in a war of textiles, oil and iron. The "have-not" countries
are expanding by war and threats of war. At the same time
they are fighting an undeclared war for foreign markets and
raw materials. The wealthy countries are seeking to prevent war, but they, too, have thrown themselves into the
struggle for customers and essential supplies.
WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT

What is the nature of this economic struggle? What are
its weapons, its strategems and its aims? What is the relationship between economic war and real war? These are
the questions we shall try to answer in the pages that follow.
W e are all fairly familiar with the politics of international
affairs. But few of us know anything like as much as we
aught to about the economics of international aflairs. Now
and then your morning newspaper mentions a trade treaty
or a foreign loan, and an international "crisis" always sprouts
a crop of economic facts. But the newspapers bury much
of their economic news in the financial section, and there's
a widespread belief that the average person can't understand
economics anyway. This story of economic warfare is
written in the belief that ordinary people not only can but
should understand such matters.
C

WHY IT IS IMPORTANT

The point is not that everything that happens in the world
can be explained in terms of trade, currency, raw materials,
profit and loss. The point is that international relations are
profoundly influenced by economic rivalries between the

great powers, and that these rivalries can and should be taken
into account if one is to understand world affairs.
Furthermore, a knowledge of these rivalries not only helps
to explain events and trends in Europe and Asia. It also
makes clear that the United States influences these foreign
events and trends, and that the influence works both ways.
That is, what is happening in Europe and Asia is of the greatest importance to the United States. For, as we shall soon
find out, the United States is an active combatant in the
current trade war, with a real stake in its outcome. And
this stake is of direct or indirect concern to every American.
PREVIEW

As an ~ o d u c t i o nto the subject of economic warfare, we

begin with a rapid sketch of current trade practices. In
order to explain these practices we then go back and take a
brief look at the age before our own, when international
trade flourished. By comparing that age with ours we try
to find out what it is that has cut down international economic intercom and sharpened economic competition in
our own times. The subject of Chaptez 3 is the part finance
plays in international relations today. Then in the next chapter we look at the weapons and t a c h Japan, Germany and
the United States employ in the current trade war. In Chap
ter 5 we discover that the smke for which this trade war is
waged most violently is the acquisition and control of raw
materials. And in the last chapter we discuss the relation
between the economic war now being waged and the real
war which often seems to be just around the comer. This
brings us in the end to the question of our own country's
policy as it b a r s on the problem of war.
From this rapid "preview" we now turn to our background
chapter, which will carry us well into the current world war
of trade and finance.

1

2. From World Tmde to Trade War
Now for a brief sketch of present-day trade war. You might
suppose that competition in international W e is simply a
matter of Germans and Americans, say, selling machinery in
Latin America, with price and
deciding who g e s the
orders and prices beiig controlled by costs of production
back home.
This was ce&y
true once. But today selling goods
abroad is no longer just a question of individuals and corporations seeking private profits. Today governments themselves play an important part in the foreign trade of their
nations. Soviet Russia, for instance, trades as a national unit and
makes her contracts in the form of diplomatic agreements. And
Germany, I d y and Japan control and direct their foreign buying and seek foreign markets through a variety of expedients,
including political pressure and even outright conquest. In
fact, not even the democratic states expect their business men
to get along in foreign markets without some help from their
governments. For Great Britain, France and the United
States have all extended trade credits to prospective foreign
customers in order to enable their business men to capture
or hold foreign markets against the competition of the totalitarian countries.
BOOSTING EXPORTS, SQUEEZING IMPORTS

While the nations are energetically invading foreign markets,
they are also stoutly defending their own markets against
foreign competition. Stephen Leacock recently wrote that
"you can't expect a really highchested nation to stoop to buy
things from other people." Of coow, most nations have to
import raw materials, and some nations, notably Great Britain,
would starve if they didn't import foodstuffs. But there's
certainly a marked tendency today to restrict imports to the

barest necessities. This is done by raising tar8 barriers, setting limits to specitied imports, paying for imports with
blocked currency which can't be spent outside the country
iswing it, or prohibiting certain imports altogether.
Such is, in briefest outline, the nature of present-day foreign
trade. Each nation is deliberately boosting exports and deliberately squeezing imports. But as my export is your import,
we are really working at cross-purposes. Why, then, are
nations trying to batter down the barriers to foreign markets
while at the same time they are busily barricading their own?
THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Before we try to answer this question, we'll have to glance
for a moment at the rise of modern international trade. Trade
itself is doubtless as old as man. But trade between nations
was enormously increased by the productivity of modern
machinery. In the eighteenth century Great Britain was the
pione& in modern industry. She made the whole world a
market for her woolens and manufactured goods. In fact,
well into the nineteenth century Britain was the world's only
great industrial state. But before the end of Victoria's reign
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rivals had come on to the field. Other nations borrowed from
London bankers, bought English textile machinery, stopped
buying English cloth. By 1910 Great Britain was still the
leading producer of textiles, but all the great powers were
competing with her in foreign markets. Even backward
Russia, using export subsidies, was underselling Manchester
in the cotton bazaars of Central Asia.
This competition, and the technological improvements that
went along with it, led to lower prices and a rapid expansion of the world markets. The result was what the chart
opposite shows. In other words, the value of international
trade tripled between 1860 and 1900 and just about doubled
in the thirteen years before the World War. Meanwhile,
commercial and industrial profits piled up beyond domestic
needs and were exported in the form of foreign loans and
Great Britain had become the world's
investments. So by
chief banker, 'with twenty billion dollars invested abroad.
But London had competitors. France had nine billion dollars
and Germany six billions (see the chart on this page). And
the rapid export of capital in turn developed new foreign
markets and new industries the world over.

. .

THE AGE OF EMPIRE-BUILDING

This competitive expansion of capitalist economy produced
an age of empire-building such as the world had never witnessed before. Poets sang the glories of empire, statesmen,
soldiers, missionaries, traders brought new lands and strange
peoples under the flags of the industrial nations. Between
I 880 and 1914 virtually the whole of Africa and much of
Asia became colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence
of the great powers. Britain already had the world's largest
empire when the land-grabbing began, but she enlarged it
by three and a quarter million square miles between 1880
and 1914. When the World War broke out France had
acquired an empire of four and t h n c q u a m r million square
miles, Germany one of a million. Italy, Belgium, Japan and
the United States were also bitten by the bug of empire
and extended their rule over foreign lands and peoples during
this period. In terms of economics, this remarkable movement
provided the empire-building nations with new markets
which they could partially close to rival countries.
THE AGE OF WORLD ECONOMY

.

Thus the generation before the World War lived in an age
-of intense competition between the great powers for markets
and colonies. In fact, this competition was one of the causes
of the war. Yet the world economy was expanding rapidly
enough to absorb most of the ever increasing production of
the industrial nations, and there were few barriers to economic intercourse betwem them. People, goods and capital
moved across national lines with relative freedom. The United
States had sizable tariff barriers but accepted millions of
European immigrants without question. The "open door"
and virtual free trade prevailed throughout the British Empire.
Capital in the form of loans and investments flowed freely
from the wealthy nations to the ends of the earth. And by
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keeping the various national currencies at fairly steady
exchange values, the gold standard solved many of the prob-

own state lines are today.
GOOD-BYE TO ALL f HAT

This golden age of an expanahig world economy was badly
shaken by t h e World W-u, though the fact was concealed
for a time by the "return to normalcy" at the war's end.
By 1924 monetary systems had been stabilized and production had been resumed. So, with the retum of prosperity
in the late twenties, it was widely believed that, in spite of +
the war, this was still the best of all possible worlds.
But it is now perfectly clear that the optimism of those,
days was based on illusions. In reality the world that the
war had made safe for democracy was an exceedingly undemocratic world, the internationalism of the League of Nations
was only skin-deep, and the prosperity of the boom years
was artificial, precatious and unevenly distributed.
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THE AGE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

The illusions of this period were suddenly shattered by the
world depression of 1929-33. Industry slowed
- - down, millions
-of men were thrown out of work. world trade colla~sed.
1
'
currencies tumbled, securities declined in value or became
mere paper. In the end the world crisis forced the nations
to fall back on their own resources. In other words, it ushered
in an age of economic nationalism.
Now economic nationalism was not a new policy, nor was
it a new idea. You can find some degree of economic nationalism being practiced as long ago as there were nations. Every
t a r 8 buriu, every law restricting immigration, every act

I
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discriminating against foreign shippers withdraws a nation
from the world economy and is therefore a step towards
agriculeconomic n a t i o n h . Arid special interests, such
ture, industry or organized labor, have long demanded such
acts of their governments, as students of American history
will recall.
But the world depression at once made the idea of economic
nationalism irresistibly attractive and its adoption almost inevitable. One after another the nations took measures designed
to protect their shrinking home markets from foreign competition and support their falling currencies. Even Great
Britain, long the champion of free economic activity in an
open world market, suspended gold payments, embargoed
foreign loans and put up a tariff wall.
THE WAR BEFORE THE WAR

The depression thus intensified economic nationalism at the
expense of the world economy. But there was more to come.
Hider's rise to power in 1933 and the aggressive cooperation
of Germany, Italy and Japan a few yeais later raised anew
the spectre of war. For the policies and ideologies of these
three countries exalted war as a means and an end. Thanks
to them, wars of conquest in Ethiopia and China, intervention in Spain and recurring war scares and aggressions in
Europe have become part of the normal course of international affairs. In fact a British military expert, Captain Liddell
H a asserts that the second world war has already started,
with the fascist nations jockeying for strategic positions in
China, Spain and Central Europe before the general conflict
begins.
With ever increasing emphasis, therefore, the other countries have been obliged to think in terms of an approaching
war. So, if they were grappling with industrial ~ S U T ~ Y
unemployment and currency problems before Hider came

S ~ ~ ,

to power, they now have the additional task of preparing
for another great war. For the age of Hider seems to mean
more cannon and less butter not only in G e m y but elsewhere as well.
THE EFFECT OF GEOGRAPHY

Of course it's obvious that the prospect of war doesn't affect
all countries dike. In fact, we'll find 'that the economic policies of the great powers differ in proportion to the relative
importance they assign to two aims, economic recovery and
preparation for war. The United States, for instance, is some
distance from the storm centers of Asia and Europe and is
therefore in no immediate danger of attack. So she has been
free to devote her attention to economic recovery based in
part on international trade rather than to military strength
based on a closed economy. But France and England are in
the European line of fire, and so they have no choice but
to raise their military budgets sharply. Yet the fact that,
between them, they can command the seas means that it is
less important for them to make themselves self-sufficient
than it is for Germany and Italy. For in case of war France
and England could probably continue to meet their needs
by importing goods and raw materials from overseas. Hence
they are still a long way from totalitarianism.
Germany and Italy, on the other hand, are pursuing policies which may cause them to resort to war at any moment.
Furthermore, they are almost certain to be cut off from
overseas supplies if and when war comes. So they have
made power and self-sufficiency, rather than economic wellbeing, the controlling factors of their policy. Similarly, in
the East, Japan's economic policies are today wholly controlled by the war in China. And the Soviet Union, threatened
by Nazi ambitions in Europe and Japan's advance in China,

is obliged to give military preparedness an important place
in its third Five-Year Plan.
We are now ready to answer the question: why are nations
energetically trying to invade foreign markets while barricading their own?
WHY EVERYBODY \YANTS TO EXPORT

There are several reasons why governments attempt to increase
exports. In the first place, they are under almost constant
pressure from individuals and corporations seeking profits in
foreig~markets. For capitalistic economies like our own produce more goods than can profitably be sold at home and so
look for foreign markets to absorb the surplus production.
Then nations want income from exports in order to be able
to pay for the imports they can't get along without. Third,
debtor nations (in other words, most of the nations of the
world) must export more goods than they import in order
to have a credit balance left over with which to pay interest
and amortization charges on their debts to foreigners and
foreign nations. Finally, the great powers may seek foreign
markets as a means of extending their political influence.
These, then, are the chief reasons why governments back
up their salesmen in foreign mark- and help them to overcome their foreign competitors.
So much for exports. Now why are imports in such bad
repute?
WHY NOBODY WANTS T O IMPORT

In defending their home markets by means of tariff walls,
governments used to be interested primarily in guaranteeing
the prosperity of certain private interests, such as the sugarbeet industry, which demanded protection against impom
of cane sugar. As a matter of fact, imports are still restricted
in order to protect local producers against foreign wmpeti-

tion. But imports are also curtailed today as a means of '
stabilizing currencies and preparing for another war.
PROTECTING CURRENCIES

Unless the difference can be made up by shipping gold, a
nation's currency is in danger when the value of its impom
exceeds the value of its exports. We'll take up the problem
of currency in Chapter 3. But we ought to say right here
that nine-tenths of the nations of the world can't afford to
balance their international accounts by exporting gold and
must therefore protect their currencies by keeping the value
of their purchases abroad at or below that of their sales
abroad. This means that they limit imports to the barest
necessities.
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PREPARING FOR WAR

In preparing for another war the nations, great and small,
are now spending between seventeen and twenty billion
dollars annually on fortifications, armies, navies, airfleets. But
armaments programs obviously mean increased imports of
certain essential raw materials. T o offset these imports, certain of the great powers have strictly limited other imports,
even of foodstuffs. Moreover, the drive for national self-sufficiency has led them to cut down their imports still further.
Take Germany, for example. Remembering the devastadng
effects the blockade had on her economy in the last months
of the World War, Germany has been trying to make herself independent of overseas supplies by producing substitutes for various materials such as cotton and rubber. In carrying out this program she has drastically reduced imports of
these materials with the deliberate intention of forcing German manufacturers to use the more costly German-made substitutes, or Ersatz.
0i course, if a nation could really achieve complete selfI8
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sufficiency, or Autarkic, as the Germans call it, it wouldn't
be fighting for foreign markets. But as a matter of fact it
would be almost literally impossible for any nation to make
itself completely self-sdcimt today. At least no country in
the world could maintain i s present economy if it were
forced to get along entirely on its own resources, whether
in peace or in war. And that goes even for the United States,
the most nearly self-suflicient of them all.
THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT

This is the basic fact which makes it virtually certain that
trade warfare and rivalry for raw materials will continue
fn spite of the trend toward closed national economies. For
the great powers mun import certain essential raw materials. But the world's supplies of oil and iron and other mential materials are limited. So the great powers are competing
with one another to get and hold them. Furthermore, these
raw materials must be paid for, and most of the great powers
can pay for them only by exporting their own products. But
finding foreign markets for their exports is more difficult
than it was in the relatively open world economy of 19I 3,
or even of 1929. So several of the powers are battling with
each other for the same restricted markets.
This, then, is the nature of the economic war we are about
to examine at closer range.

3. Finance and Currency
Judged in terms of military and economic strength, there
are seven great powers in the world: Great Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, Japan and the United States.
But only three of them posses the weapon of finance for

use abroad. Great Britain, France and the United States hold
among thcm almost three-fourths of the world's gold. They are
the world's great creditor nations, with large incomes from
foreign loans and investments. They alone have capital available for export in large quantities. Russia, Germany, Japan
and Italy, on the other hand, are debtor nations with little
or no income from foreign loans and investments. Unlike the
other great powers, they haven't enough capital to be able
to do much financial maneuvering abroad.
T o be sure, Germany bettered her financial position by
seizing the reserves of gold and foreign currency she found
in Vienna when she annexed Austria, in March 1938, and
in Prague when she occupied Czecho-Slovakia, in March 1939.
Recently she has even extended trade credits to Turkey and
Poland. Japan likewise has made some investments in China,
chiefly in the territory under the Japanese currency system.
But, generally speaking, we can say that the totalitarian countries aren't able to compete with Great Britain, France and
the United States in seeking profits and power through foreign investments. They are also less able than the other great
powers to influence smaller nations by means of loans. Furthermore, their currencies would be exceedingly vulnerable in
the world market if they hadn't bken drastic measures to
armor-plate them.
From the point of view of finance, then, the world's seven
great powers are sharply divided into "haves" and "have-nots."
In this chapter we shall try to discover what bearing this
fact has on international affairs.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT BEFORE THE WORLD WAR

Before the World War foreign investment was a powerful
force in international politics. Investments in backward countries employed capital that couldn't be profitably invested at
home and created opportunities to make more profits. Take
20

6,

the famous Berlin-to-Bagdad railway for an example. It
rewarded the bankers who underwrote the bond issues, yielded
a good return to the investors who bought the bonds, enabled
Germany to triple her trade with Turkey in ten years and
created unlimited openings for German business enterprise
within the Turkish Empire.
THE DECLINE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Since the war, however, and particularly since the depression, foreign investment has declined as a vital force in world
politics. Before the war annual long-term capital exports from
all nations rose to almost two and a half billion dollars. But
between 1924 and 1930 the annual export was only about
one and a half billion dollars. And since 1930 foreign investment has been close to a standstill.
Of course undeveloped regions the world over would profit
from new investments if made under proper controls, and
foreign investing will undoubtedly increase in another boom.
But there are indications that it won't regain its former importance. The reasons are two: foreign markets for investments
are now relatively unsafe and inhospitable; and a part of
the world's capital which was formerly available for export
has been virtually locked up at home. These two facts are
worth closer attention.
THE EFFECT OF NATIONALISM

The enemies of foreign investment are nationalism and socialism, whatever the brand. One of the aims of the new nationalism which has swept over China, India, Iran and Turkey since
the war is to seek financial as well as political independence
of the western powers. This means that public works and
industry, even in British India, are being financed more and
more by native capital. If this trend continues, it looks as
though foreign investors will eventually be eliminated alto-

,

gether. in me circumstances, it's scarcely surprising that
they aren't much inclined to send any more of their capital
to Asia.
THE EFFECT OF SOCIALISM

Socialism is even harder on foreign investors than nationalism,
as Soviet Russia and Mexico both go to show. Immediately
after the Russian revolution of -November I 9 I 7, the Bolshevik, took over foreign holdings in Russia and paid little
or no compensation to the owners. Similarly Mexico has
seized large foreign-owned plantations from time to time
and distributed them among the peasants. Recently the Mexican government has also expropriated extensive British- and
American-owned oil lands. On the insistence of the United
States, Mexico has recently agreed to pay the American landowners, and it is possible that the oil companies will receive
some compensation for their losses, too. Nevertheless it's
clear that neither Russia nor Mexico accepts the idea that
foreign investments are sacred and must not be touched. It's
clear, too, that such experiences as they have had in Russia
and Mexico aren't likely to encourage investors to sink anymore of their funds in those countries. And it's probable that
state and national socialism will spread to other countries as
time goes on and so will narrow the field for foreign investments still further.
CAPITAL IS N O LONGER FREE TO EXPORT

Furthermore, private capital has recently been less free than it
once was to seek foreign markets anyway. This is because
more and more of it has been going into government hands in
the form of taxes and loans and also because, to meet their
mounting expenses, several of the great powers have limited
or prohibited the export of capital from their countries altogether. Thus new overseas investments have declined not only

Ii
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because the foreign investor's capital is unsafe abroad but also
.
because it is needed at home.
BUT PAST INVESTMENTS STILL PLAY A PART

In spite of this decline in new foreign investments, however,
old foreign investments continue to have a direct bearing on
international relations. For they divide the world into two
antagonistic camps. In one camp are the nations which have no
income, or very little income, from past investments abroadinay in fact be indebted to investors and bondholders in the
wealthier nations. In the other camp are the creditor countries,
the countries which realize an income from past investments
in foreign lands. Thus Great Britain, France and the United
States have billions of dollars in foreign investments which they
made in the days when capital flowed freely over the world.
Though less than it once was, the income from these investments remains a large credit item in the international accounts
of the nations which made them.
Moreover, this income is an important factor in the present
armaments race. For the "have-not" powers, with debts, s m d
stores of gold and very little income from abroad, find it very
hard to pay for imports of essential raw materials for their
armaments industries. What they can buy depends almost
entirely on what they can sell. But Great Britain and France
can and do use the income they get from past investments
abroad to buy not only raw materials but actual instruments
of war manufactured abroad-notably American-made bombing planes. Thus they have a distinct advantage over the totalitarian countries-one, furthermore, which they could continue
to exploit in wartime. In fact, as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain complacently told the House of Commons in December
1938, Britain's financial resources (including her investments
abroad) might perfectly well prove to be the deciding factor
in another world war.

HIGH FINANCE AND WORLD' POLITICS

We've seen that foreign investments are less important than
they once were, but that they still strengthen the hands of
the creditor nations in the great game of power politics. Now
let's look at the weapon of finance as it may be used to inflict
punishment or to reward friendship. T o illustrate the first of
these uses-inflicting punishment-we'll take the "reparation"
bill the Allies handed Germany at the end of the war. T o illustrate the second-rewarding friendship-we'll turn to certain
political loans which have influenced Europe's diplomatic
alignments in the past twenty years.
INFLICTING PUNISHMENT

The peacemakers at Versailles imposed on Germany terms
which were designed to eliminate her as a force in European
affairs. Among these terms were provisions for enormous
"reparation" payments-compensation for all the damage done
in the war. Reparations saddled the Germans with a debt it
would have taken them generations to pay off. The initial payment itself went far towards cleaning the young German
Republic out of gold. The result was that she could pay the.
remaining debt of more than one hundred billion marks only
by means of exports. But other nations raised emergency tariffs
against German goods, and thenceforth reparations could be
paid only with the aid of foreign loans.
Thus a curious merry-go-round of high finance enlivened
the boom of the late twenties. The United States raised loans
for Germany. Out of these loans Germany paid reparations to
France and Great Britain. And from the reparation payments
France and Gmat Britain paid us installments on the money
they had borrowed from us during the war.
By the Young Plan of 1929reparation demands were scaled
down and a "final settlement" was made in which the German
government agreed to continue payments until 1988. With

'Thur a curious merry-go-round of high ilnance enlivened the boom of
the late twenties.'

the depression the whole shaky business of loans, reparations
and debt payments collapsed, as many economists had predicted it would. Yet even after she had stopped paying reparations, Germany was left with an impoverished middle class
and a huge burden of foreign debts.
REWARDING FRIENDS

Reparations, then, are as good an example as you could find
of the way in which nations may use finance as a means of
infiicting punishment. But the power of finance could scarcely
be used this way except at the end of a war. Financial power
may more readily be employed to gain and strengthen friends,
as France demonstrated in the years after the war. For while

Germany was paying reparations in the twenties France was
building up and financing an elaborate system of military
alliances designed to keep defeated Germany in her place.
Before the rise of Hitler, in 1933, France had five allies in
Europe: Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and
Yugoslavia. In order to arm and strengthen these allies, France
lent them money, not only through the twenties but well into
the depression Although these loans were profitable to French
bankers, investors and armaments makers, the principal reason
for making them was clearly political.
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PREVENTING ANSCHLUSS

The peace settlement of 1919was further bolstered for a time
by political loans to Austria. These loans were designed to prevent Anschluss (union) with Germany. The two German
states would have been united in 1919 if the peacemakers had
followed Wilson's principle of the self-determination of
peoples. But no one at the Peace Conference showed any interest in making Germany larger than she had been before the
war, and so-Austria was made a separate s m d state without
enough resources inside her borders to live on. When Austria
came near economic collapse, in 1922, the League of Nations
took over the management of her finances. France and other
countries then carried the Austrians through a protracted
crisis by means of loans totaling some $12~,ooo,ooo.But in
193I, when Austria and Germany proposed to form a customs
union, France and her allies summarily vetoed the project,
and the World Court declared it illegal by an 8-to-7 vote. At
the same time the powers granted Austria a new loan in return
for a promise to renounce Anschluss for another twenty years.
With the rearming of Germany under Hitler, however, the
French weapon of finance lost its cutting edge. And when the
Nazis seized Austria, in March 1938, France lost her political
influence in Vienna altogether.
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THE WEAPON OF FINANCE TODAY

Thus the fate of Austria suggests that the weapon of finance
is less potent today than marching men and rolling tanks. And
so it may be. Nevertheless, foreign loans are still a factor in
world politics. Of course, it is not very likely that France or
Britain will be able to use loans to influence small states that

'Financial power may more readily be employed to gain or strengthen
friends, as France demonstrated in the years after the war.'
(Shading show8 France and her port-war allies;
darker rhading the Little Entente stater.)

live in the shadow of Nazi Germany's military machine. But
small states which are too far away to feel the &eat of German arms may still be influenced by foreign loans. In Latin
America, for instance, the outcome of the Gerrnan-American
trade war may yet be decided by the United States' superior
ability to extend credits and loans. And Franco's Spain may
prove to be no puppet of Germany and Italy for the reason
that Spain's reconstruction will require foreign financial aid
only London and Paris can afford to give.
As a final comment on the power of finance, we ought perhaps to point out that not even military conquests can be m e d
to economic advantage without large expenditures. We ought
perhaps to point out, too, that the three nations which have
recently acquired new territory are in no position to finance
such expenditures. In other words, thanks to their military
adventures, the "havenot" countries are in even greater need
of foreign loans today than they were before they made their
conquests. But their credit is extremely low with foreign bankers and investors. Therefore their only recourse is "political
borrowing." Nazi bonds, for instance, could probably be sold
in England if the British government would endorse them. But
the British government isn't likely to endorse them unless Berlin agrees to a breathing-spell in the arms race and an end to
German expansion. This now seems very unlikely. Yet, sooner
or later, Germany's need for a foreign loan may force her to
come to terms.
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THE CURRENCY HEADACHE

Antagonism bemeen the "haves" and the "have-nots" continues
to be our theme as we turn to the subject of currency in international relations.
We've already seen that protecting their currencies is one
of the chief concerns of the nations today, and that a nation's
cumncy is in no danger if the nation keeps its international

accounts balanced. These accounts we call a country's "balance of international payments." Such a b b c e b nothing
more than a statement of all the income a nation receives from
abroad and all the payments it makes to foreigners and foreign
governments. As the m o o n on this page shows, the income
includes the obvious item of payments for expow and the less
obvious item of payments for "services rendered," such as

'These accounts we call a country's "balance of International payments." Such a balance is nothing more than a statement of all
the income a nation receives from abroad and all the payments
it makes to foreignera and forelgn governments.'

carrying foreign goods at sea and feeding, housing and transporting tourists. Income also includes interest and profits on
foreign loans and investments. All t h s c items are credits in a
nation's international accounts. Similarly, every nation has
debit items in its balance of payments. These include not only
payments for the imports it has taken in but payments for
services received from foreigners and the value of capital
exported in the form of foreign loans and investments.

1
1

THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Now there is only one essential difference between international
accounts and the private accounts we are all familiar with.
That difference is the difference between. one national currency and another. You can't go into an American store and
buy things with pounds, shillings and pence, and English landladies would be astonished to be offered dollars for their rents.
So Englishmen visiting the United States must buy dollars,
while Americans living in London must buy pounds.
This, of course, is a problem we're only too glad to turn
over to the bankers. And they have no trouble solving it, with
the cooperation of bankers abroad, if the American demand
for pounds is the same as the English demand for dollars. For
then the bankers can just agree to swap.
Usually, though, the English demand for dollars is much
greater than the American demand for pounds. What happens
then? Then London bankers buy dollars in Paris, Amsterdam,
Tokyo or anywhere else that dollars can be bought for pounds
(or for any other currency the London bankers have to offer).
WHERE GOLD COMES IN

But if the demand for dollars in the world's money markets
rose beyond the supply, the price of the dollar would rise relative to the price of the pound or other currencies. And at a
certain point in that rise, London bankers would find it cheaper
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to buy gold with their pounds and ship the gold to New York
to square their accounts than it would be for them to buy
dollars.
Naturally this is perfectly all right with the American bankers, because gold is the universal medium of exchange on which
virtually all currencies are based. But it's obvious that a nation
that settled its international accounts by shipping gold year
after year would eventually exhaust its gold stores. And this
would not only leave it with no base for its money but would
make it an international bankrupt.
As a matter of fact, before the war, and for some years after
the war, international accounts didn't often have to be balanced
by gold shipments. For in those days people, goods and capital
moved across national frontiers fairly freely, tariff walls were
low and the world market expanding. So it wasn't very hard
for most countries to match their imports with exports. If a
nation did ever find itself with large debit items its international
credits wouldn't cover, it could usually get loans abroad without much trouble and make the balance up that way.
For all these reasons, it was seldom necessary to ship gold to
settle international accounts before the war-or even in the
early twenties, for that matter. When it was necessary, most
nations could ship small amounts of gold to cover their deficits
without running the risk of losing their whole supply. In other
words, nations were then "on the gold standard."
THE GOLD STANDARD GOES, AND WHY

Today most nations have abandoned the gold standard in
international relations. They have done so for two reasons.
The first is that people, goods and capital no longer move
freely enough to keep international accounts more or less
automatically balanced. The second is that the available supply
of gold is now very unevenly distributed. This is strikingly
shown on the map opposite. According to it, the world's supply

'The world% supply of monetary mold b worth about $24,000,000,000
today. Of this the United States has more than half.'

of monetary gold is worth about $24,,000000,,000 today. Of
this the United States has more than half-the largest amount
of gold ever held by one nation. (Not all of this gold belongs
to the United States-some of it has been sent here for safe
keeping. But very little of it belongs to the "have-not" countries.) And a quarter is shared by Britain and France, Britain
having about three billion dollars worth and France two and
a half billion dollars worth.
Hence, today, less than one-fourth of the world's gold has
to serve as the basis for the currency systems of some fifty-odd
nations. Partly because of this unequal distribution of gold and

partly because of the recent trend away from an open, international economic system, most nations have been forced off
the gold standard. That is, they no longer allow their international accounts to be settled by shipments of gold.
WHAT ITS GOING HAS MEANT

But this means that they must maintain a balance between
their international credits and their international debits without
shipping gold. For otherwise their currencies would collapse.
So to protect their currencies they increase their credit items
by subsidizing exports, encouraging tourists to visit their lands
and stimulating their shipping, both freight and passenger. At
the same time they cut down their debit items by limiting
or prohibiting imports and partially or wholly repudiating past
debts. Of course they also set up rigid controls over foreign
exchange itself.
Now it is the totalitarian countries which have carried government control of foreign trade and exchange the farthest,
and the result, in terms of currency, has been a high degree of
stability. During the Sudeten crisis, for instance, most European
currencies fell rapidly. But the German mark scarcely trembled.
The explanation is to be found in the drastic measures the
Nazi government has taken to balance its international accounts
as well as in its complete control of foreign exchange. Thus in
1934 the export of marks was prohibited, and in 1936 the
export of capital was made punishable by death. As a result,
whatever the condition of Germany's economy may be, or
however acute the crisis in Europe, there is no "flight from the
mark." That is, panicky Germans do not try to get their money
out of Germany, and thus depress the mark.
By such drastic measures the Reich has maintained the par
value of the marks used by foreigners at forty cents. Of course,
this means that the mark is out of line with most of the other
currencies of the world. But Germany has gained at least one
advantage from this fact. (Or, to put it the other way round,
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in meeting interest and other charges on her foreign debts she
has profited by the devaluation of the franc and pound.) For
her fonycmt marks pay off a larger part of her debt to France
and Great Britain than would an equal number of &valued
marks.
THE USES OF DEVALUATION

Unlike Germany, the other great powus have all devalued
their currencies, either because their economic situations forced
them to or because they sought to gain by devaluation either at
home or in trade competition abroad. There arc advantages
and disadvantages in devaluation. Domestic prices tend to rise.
This means that debtors are benefited. For, with prices up,
fifty sacks of potatoes, say, will pay off a larger part of a farm
mortgage than before. Consequently certain interests and
classes will argue for "cheap money," while other interests and
classes will denounce it. But, paradoxically, though devaluation
usually raises prices at home, it lowers them abroad, at least
temporarily. Therefore governments have occasionally
decreased the gold content of their currencies in order to enable *
their citizens to undersell foreign trade competitors abroad.
JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE

A good example of this maneuver is what Japan did early
in the thirties. Japan decided upon an intensive invasion of the
world's markets in 1931. So she depreciated the yen. In that
way she lowered the prices of Japanese goods in foreign markets. For, since pounds, francs and dollars would now buy
more yen, they would also buy more Japanese wares. For this
and other reasons, although depression was world-wide and
international trade at a low ebb, Japanese exports doubled in
value between 1931 and 1934.
Japan's advantage was a temporary one, however. For the
other nations met her trade aggression by raising their tariffs

against the cheapened Japanese goods. Then, too, currencies
were generally devalued. The pound, for instance, began falling late in 1931. Since 1934 it has been held at between 55 and
60 per cent of its former value. And, shortly after the pound
was devalued, the entire "sterling bloc" followed suit: in other
words, most of the nations of the British Commonwealth, the
' Scandinavian countries and other states in close economic
relationship with England devalued their currencies also. In
1934 the United States reduced the gold content of the dollar
about 40 per cent. Finally, in 1936 the members of the "gold
bloc," consisting of France, Switzerland and the Netherlands,
likewise devalued their currencies.
THE CONSEQUENCES

Now though this country-bycountry devaluation of currencies brought temporary made advantages to the nations which
resorted to it, by constantly upsetting foreign exchange values
it put a new obstacle in the way of international transactions.
Between 1930 and 1933, for example, the yen was quoted as
low as 30 cents and as high as 50 cents, and it fluctuated widely
within single years Obviously this nervous, jumpy condition
of international exchange has made it difEcuit and risky to do
business outside your own country.
THE REMEDIES

Various nations have attempted to solve this problem either
by avoiding the use of foreign exchange entirely or by agreeing
to maintain their currencies at fixed relations to other currencies.
BARTER

The fim of these expedients, dodging the issue by avoiding the
use of foreign exchange altogether, has given rise to international barter on a large scale. Goods have been exchanged
across national boundaries almost exactly as goods must hove

hem traded in prehistoric times. An example of this sort of
thing today is the trade bctween Germany and Russia.
CURRENCY. STABILIZATION

The second solution, that of currency stabilization by international cooperation, was whtten into the tripartite agreement which the United States, Great Britain and France concluded in the fall of 1936. By that agreement, those three countries pledged themselves not to depreciate their currencies again
for trade advantage. Thus they ruled out a "currency war"
among themselves. But they also agreed to cooperate to maintain the relations existing between their currencies at the time
the agreement was signed. T o carry out this part of the agreement each power set up a stabilization or equalization agency
which buys and sells foreign exchange as may be necessary to
keep the dollar, pound and franc approximately at the agreed
relationship. Thus the United States has a stabilization fund of
some two billion dollars. This fund is operated in complete
secrecy by Treasury officials whose job it is to keep the dollar
from rising and the franc and pound from falling.
Unfortunately, recurrent European crises tend to force the
dollar up and drive the franc and pound down. Yet duringthe Sudeten crisis of September 1938 the tripartite agreement
undoubtedly kept the franc and pound from falling faster and
farther than they did. In general its effect has been to insure
a fair degree of stability in the relative values of the three currencies. From the point of view of international economic intercourse this has been a distinct gain, not only for the three
powers which made the agreement but also for the whole
sterling bloc and the other states whose currencies are kept in
constant relation to the dollar.
WIDEN THE RANGE?

Furthermore, the tripartite pact is not an exclusive arrangement but is open to the signature of any government which is
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interested in widening the range of stable economic reladom.
Before international exchange can be widely stabilized, however, it will be necessary to build up the gold reserves of the
poorer nations and thus relieve them of the necessity of resorting to paralyzing economic controls to protect their currencies.
And before these reasonable economic adjustments are possible,
the "have-not" powers will have to abandon war and threats
of war as their everyday instruments of foreign policy.
So in the present world situation it looks as though currency
stabilization on an international basis will have to remain a
monopoly of the great democracies and the small states that
are closely associated with them in economic matters. So, too,
the totalitarian "have-not" powers will have to content themselves with currencies whose stability depends on the crude
expedient of barter and on drastic controls and penalties-a
sign of political strength, perhaps, but a sign also of economic
weakness.
TO SUM UP

W e have now dealt with finance under the topics of foreign
investment, foreign loans and currency. From our survey it
should be clear that there is great inequality of financial
resources among the great powers. This means that the United
States, Great Britain and France have a decided advantage
over the "have-not" countries both in trade warfan in general
and in the struggle for raw materials in particular.
But it should also be clear that levelling tendencies have
been at work. For, on the one hand, the wcalthy nations
now derive less advantage from foreign investments and loans
than they used to. Thus we no longer hear about Great Britain
producing nothing but living comfortably on the proceeds of
her foreign investments. Nor does the accumuIation of the
world's gold in the Uniccd States contribute anything to ow,
own national income.

I

On the other hand, the poorer great powers have thought
up ways of keeping their currencies at par without having to
shxp gold and have discovered that even without gold or foreign exchange they can supply at least part of their needs by
barter.

Furthermore, the totalitarian states have made up for their
hancial weakness to some extent by arming themselves to the
teeth, glodying war as an instrument of national policy and
pursuing economic as well as political ends by war and threats
of war.
But the "have-not" countries haven't solved their financial
problems by their conquests and annexations. In fact, the costs
of their political and military victories have reduced their
standards of living and driven them step by step nearer the
point of bankruptcy.
THE ELEMENTS OF A BARGAIN?

Thus the world is divided into aggressor countries which are
in increasing need of foreign financial help and creditor countries which could and probably would pay a large price for
genuine assurances of peace. T o the casual onlooker, there
would appear to be the elements of a bargain in this situation.
So it's not beyond the range of possiblity that international
finance may reappear as a vital factor in world affairs yet.
But no bargain can be struck unless the "have-nots" set limits
to their expansionist ambitions. As long as the present trend
toward another world war continues, the prospects for financial "appeasement" aren't bright. That is, no great power is
likely to come to the financial aid of another great power that
seems likely to attack it or precipitate another world war. In
fact, the financial resources of the wealthy nations are now
being spent on armaments, though they could conceivably be
used to get an agreement to limit armaments. And, if war
should occur, the financial resources of the great democracies
would help to determine the outcome.
38

4. Trade Warfare
The rise of great industrial states was marked, as we have
noticed, by intense competition in the world's markets. But
before the war new markets were opened by traders, missionaries and marines and world consumption increased rapidly
enough to absorb the expanding volume of goods produced by
modem technology. The chart on page 43 indicates the upward
swing of world trade before the war. Periodic depression and
wars interrupted this procm, and the World War shifted a
large part of production and commerce to destructive purposes. But by the end of the twenties world trade had recovered
from the war and the first post-war depression. In fact, aided
by foreign loans and investments, trade in 1929was well ahead
of the 1913level. (Notice, however, that the rate of increase
bemeen 1913 and 1929 was only half the rate of increase
between 1900 and 1913.)
THE WORLD MARKET SHRINKS

This upward trend was interrupted by the war and was brought
to an end by the depression of 1 9 2 ~ 3 3Purchasing
.
power
declined with the slowing down of industry and the coming
of hard times; currencies collapsed; and governments employed
political measures to give domestic producers a monopoly in
their shrunken home markets.
One of the most drastic of these measures was our own
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, passed in 1930. This act led to a
wave of protectionist reprisals abroad. In 1931 even Great
Britain abandoned her championship of free trade and encircled the British Isles with tariff walls. In I 93 2 the whole British
Commonwealth of Nations agreed to a scheme of preferential
tariffs against foreign imports, while the German Republic
raised its customs duties on some commodities as much as one
hundred per cent. Since 1933, the year in which Hitler came

41. Industrial production has now recovered from the world
depression. In fact it has gone considerably ahead of the 1929
level in almost every country. And, as the following chart
shows, during 1937 the volume of world trade reached almost
the 1929 level-though it slipped back again in 1938. But the
value of world trade remains at less than half the 1929 figure.
(The explanation of this difference between the volume and
the value of international trade lies in the nature of the products now exchanged. Today there is less trade in manufactures
and more trade in raw materials and semi-finished materials
than there was in 1929. One reason for this is that many
nations now limit impom of consumers' goods, such as textiles, in order to import raw materials for their industries, particularly their war industries.)
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THE TREND TOWARD AUTARKIE

The world market has shrunk since 1930 not only because the
nations have wanted to meet their needs by their own production, but also because they have been obliged to buy less from
abroad. For nations that can't export goods can't pay for
imports, and the protected world market has consequently
forced almost every nation to produce at home some of the
things it formerly bought abroad. The Germans have made
a virtue of this necessity by exalting the ideal of Autarkic, or
economic self-sufficiency, and German scientists have been
given the task of producing satisfactory substitutes for such
imports as cotton, wool and rubber. Italy, too, has increased
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'Industrial production has now recovered from the world depression.
But the value of world trade remain8 a t lees than halt the 1929 figure.'

her wheat production enough to feed her people on a reduced
diet without imports. She has also experimented with substitute
materials. The Italian ambassador to Great Britain is even
reported to have worn a suit made of skimmed milk to demonstrate the remarkable qualities of casein!
Now a relatively balanced economy is a possibility for most
nations. For, if they have arable land, industrial nations can
raise at least part of their own foodstuffs. And agricultural
nations don't need to forego the luxury of factories and mills
if they can finance and operate them-even, for that matter,
if they have to import the necessary raw materials-Italy, for
instance. But complete self-sufEciency is a fantastic ambition
for any nation. It can be achieved only by resort to a medieval
economy, and it can be approached only at the cost of a lowered standard of living.

THE

STRUGGLE GROWS BITTER

So the economic interdependence of the world remains a stubborn fact. And this stubborn fact is the basis of the present
war of wde. For to pay for imports the nations need markets
for their own goods. And this in turn means competition with
other nations producing the same wares. Furthermore, the competition is k d y , even bitterly fought, for the world market is
much less friendly to foreign goods than it was in 1913, or
even in 1929.
Now that we've seen what forces have produced the trade
war which is being waged so actively all over the world today,
let's look at it a little closer and learn what it means in action
on the battlefront. T o do this we can examine the weapons
and tactics of three of the belligerents: Japan, Germany and
the United States.
JAPAN'S TRADE WAR WITH THE WEST

Since 1931Japanese trade competition has been felt the world
over. But Japan has made particular efforts to capture the

THE RISE AND FALLOF WORLDTRADE
EACH CRATE ROPRtShNTS 10% OF 191a VOCUMt
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markets of Asia by eliminating her western competitors, particularly the British. This she has attempted to do in two ways:
by peaceful penetration, as in British India, and by military
conquest, as in China.
JAPAN IN INDIA

For a century and a half India was Great Britain's most profitable colonial possession. The reason was that India was a vast
and expanding market for British goods and an open field for
British business enterprise and investment. Chief among India's
imports for a century were the cotton piece goods of famed
F ' Sancashire. Since the World War, however, the British textile
manufacturers have had to meet two new competitors in the
Indian market. The first of these competitors is the native
Indian producer. The Indian nationalist leader, Gandhi, has
carried on a boycott of English textiles and has attacked "the
machine" as an enemy of spiritual values. As a result there
has been an increase in India's native handloom production of
wearing apparel. But what is of much greater importance,
from the point of view of Lancashire, is the rapid growth of
s
modern machine industry within India itself. This industry i
now meeting the greater part of India's textile needs. As a
r d t , this British colony has reduced its imports of cotton
textiles by two-thirds within the past quarter of a century.
But that isn't the end of the cotton-minded Englishman's
worries by any means. For he has a second competitor in India.
Within the confines of the diminished Indian market, Great
Britain has been challenged and adroitly fought by Japan.
Thus, after the depreciation of the yen in 193I, Indian bazaars
were increasingly stocked with Japanese cotton cloth priced
well below the English cloth. Alarmed, both British textile
interests and the influential Indian Chambers of Commerce and
Industry demanded government aid against the invader. The
government of India responded by jacking up the tariffs on

non-British textiles. But this expedient failed to check the
Japanese advance, and so a prohibitive tariff was demanded.
KING COTTON SPEAKS

At this point Japan brandished a new weapon: by threatening
to cut off her substantial imports of India's raw cotton, she
forced the government of India to come to terms. Rather than
lose the Japanese market for her raw cotton India agreed in
1934 not to raise her tariffs against Japanese textiles again. At
the same time fie two governments set a fixed ratio between
India's imports of Japanese cloth and Japan's imports of Indian
raw cotton. As a result of this bargain, Japan was able to continue her trade war with Britain as long as she continued to
buy her raw cotton in India. The present war in China has
forced Japan to concentrate on producing war materials at the
expense of textiles. Yet during the hrst half of 1938 it was
Japan, not Britain, which was at the top of the list of nations
supplying India with textiles.
It's clear, then, that Japan's peaceful penetration of India
has been a success. And the British textile interests seem to be
on the run. But, thanks to India's new nationalism and her economic development, neither British nor Japanese trade is going
to have a very brilliant future there. For the growth of India's
own textile industry is gradually reducing her dependence on
textile imports from any country. In fact it's possible that
Indian bazaar merchants will some day be selling no cloth that
isn't stamped "Made in India."
JAPAN IN CHINA

Just as Japan's trade prospects in India are limited by Indian
nationalism, so in China before the outbreak of the present war
Japan's trade prospects were limited both by western competition and by the rise of Chinese nationalism. Indeed, this fact
is a clue to the cause of the present Far Eastern war. For Japan
is really waging two undeclared wars in China. One of these

wus aims to destroy the Chinese nationalists, who have carried on boycons of Japanese merchandise and who much
under the banner of "China for the Chinese." The other war
aims to eliminate western competitors, who have operated in
China under the principle of the "Open Door."
The "Open Door" principle means simply that China shall
remain a sovereign stan open to the trade and investments of
all nations on equal terms. This principle the powers have from
thne 'to time approved. But Japan's conquests have greatly
reduced the territory under Chinese sovereignty. Furthermore,
it is now evident that Chinese territory that falls under Japanese rule is likely to be reserved largely for the trade of its
master. For Japan has systematically eliminated foreign competition in her puppet state, Manchoukuo, and foreign traders
are now being squeezed out of her newly acquired territory
in North and Central China also. In short, Japan's aim seems
to be to create a great regional economy in eastern Asia under
the acknowledged and exclusive domination of herself.
Now the economic union of China, Manchoukuo and Japan
could conceivably go a long way toward improving Oriental
living standards. But Japan's choice of war as the means of
bringing such a union about suggests that her policy is not controlled by her solicitude for the well-being of the Chinese
people. Japan's aim seems to be, rather, to increase the
resources at her command in order to be able to play the game
of power politics on equal terms with the strongest western
nations. Whether she can reach this goal will depend not only
on whether or not she wins the war but also on whether or not
she succeeds in solving the grave economic problems the war
has raised for her.
BUT WHAT HAS SHE GAlNEDa

While we're on this subject, there are two things we might
say about this war of Japan's, both of them very much to the
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point. First, the conruct has cost the Japanese nation a considerable part of its wealth and an increpsing proportion of its
income. H u e is one minor item in the cw Japan Du had to
speed up h a heavy industries in order to meet the demands
of her war machine. TOdo this, she has had to import so
much iron and oil that she hasn't been able to keep up her
imports of raw cotton for her textile industry. So h a production of cotton textiles has fallen off, and this in turn has
cut down her exports of cotton cloth and has thus made it
difficult for her to pay for the iron and oil she has had to
import. The result has been that Japan has had to ship abroad
more than half her smaIl gold stores. For she hasn't had any
other way of keeping her intematiod accounts balanced.
The second thing to be said here b o u t Japan's war is that
eighteen months of it have worked havoc with China's cities,
factories and railways and have created a reconstruction prablem which must be solved before Japan can begin to exploit
her conquests. But Japan hasn't enough financial ~tsources,
raw materials or machinery to undertake the remmtmction
job herself. And the nations that are in a position to help her
are fundamentally opposed to her policies and aims in China,
Thus Great Britain and the Uniad States have protested vigorously against the slamming of the "Open Door." At the end
of 1938 they began belatedly contributing to China's rskrnncL
by extending aDdc credits to thc government of Chiang Knishek.
The conclusion to be drawn from this seems to be that while
bombing a market may eliminate foreign competito1~, it
involves so much economic waste that it is likely to impoverish
the bomber as well as the bombed. Quite apart from any
lmmnhian considerations, therefon, this is a trade practice
we can't recommend. In fact it's possible that "have-not" countries that resort to war will remain "have-not" countries. For
what they gain in territory, Prde monopolies and raw materials
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'The Hull trade program ir a notable attempt to dredge the
nineteen other nation8 have lowered their tariffs on thlil

will probably not cover the cosr~of wax and r e c o ~ c t i o n .
Besides, conquered peoples don't always stay conquered. In
the past the Chinese have even been known to absorb their
conquerors and put them to work!
NAZI MARKETING METHODS
So much for Japan's part in the current trade war. Now comes

Germany.
As we have already said, Nazi Germany's policy of Autmkie
has not made her independent of foreign trade by any means.
So, to pay for essential imports of raw materials and food,
Germany must export. As Hider has said with great emphasis,
she must "export or die." But the Reich's export trade has been
confronted by three major obstacles. In the first place, the
Nazis' persecution of the Jews and Hider's aggressions have
shocked foreign opinion and have led to determined efforts
to boycott German goods. Second, with the mark k g at 40
cents, German goods are costly in terms of devalued foreign
currencies. Third, foreign markets are well protected by tariff
walls, and some nations, notably the United States, collect
higher customs duties on German goods than they do on other
foreign goods.
GERMANY'S COUNTER-MOVES

Here are some of the things Germany has done to remove or
get around these obstacles: she has attempted to check the boycott by calling it a hostile act and thus obliging small states
under her influence and great powers seeking her friendship
to discourage or even forbid it. Also, by treating German Jews
as hostages, she has sought to weaken boycott movements in
still other countries.

.

EXPORT SUBSIDIES

In order to meet the trade competition of devalued currencies,
Germany has liberally subsidized her exports. That is, she has

actually paid her manufacturers part of the cost of production
of their export goods in order to bring the prices of the exports
down to or even below the prices asked by foreign c o n
petitora T o finance this policy, each branch of German industry is obliged to take part of the proceeds of its sales inside
Germany and contribute it to the subsidy fund, which is
administered by the Minisay of Economics. In this way it is
estimated that about one billion marks have been made available each year to enable German exporters to outbid and
undersell their competitors abroad. In addition, the German
government itself now contributes about half a billion marks
a year for the same purpose. So it's not surprising that Germany's export subsidy has been the subject of indignation and
protest among the Nazis' commercial rivals.
BARTER AGREEMENTS

Finally, in order to crash foreign tariff barriers, Germany
carries on the greater part of her trade through barter agreements. But she generally streamlines the barter principle in
two ways. She may pay for imports by depositing marks to
the credit of the importing countries in "clearing accounts" in
Berlin. The importing countries can then "clear the accounts"
only by buying German goods. Or Germans may pay for
imports with "ASKI" marks. These marks are worthless outside the Reich and so must be spent for German goods or
services if they are to be spent at all.
By purchasing foreign foodstuffs and raw materials through
clearing agreements or with ASKI marks, Germany virtually
forces other countries to buy German goods in spite of their
tariff walls. She also forces them to buy German goods even
if they could buy more cheaply from some other producer.
The use of clearing accounts and ASKI marks therefore has
the effect of eliminating foreign competitors in foreign markets. The extent to which Germany has traded through direct

barter, clearing agreements and ASK1 marks is indicated by
the fact that during 1937 only I 5 per cent of her imports were
paid for in free, or "negotiable," currency. This record was
not matched in 1938, however, for in that year Germany
bought large quantities of war materials which she couldn't
get by the barter method and for which she accordingly had
to pay cash.
THE NAZI TRADE DRIVE IN THE BALKANS

These trade practices of Germany's have been employed with
particular emphasis along the route of the famed Berlin-toBagdad railway of pre-war days. Nazi Germany began her
recent trade campaign in the Balkans with large purchases of
agricultural products and raw materials. These goods she
bought at handsome prices, thus creating goodwill and to a
great extent eliminating foreign buyers. She then solved the
problem of how to pay for the goods by depositing the
amounts due in clearing accounts in Berlin. As these accounts
could be used only in Germany, they forced the Balkan nations
to restrict imports from other countries in order to use up their
accumulating credits in Berlin. As a result the economy of
southeastern Europe, from Hungary to Turkey, was to a considerable degree joined with that of the Third Reich.
This German trade drive may have deprived the Balkan
states of foreign currency and prevented them from buying
wherever the buying was good. But it has brought a certain
amount of prosperity to the principal industry of the Balkans,
namely agriculture. For Germany has actually bought Balkan
farm products on a large scale, and that is something that no
other great power has been able to do. On the other hand, the
trade advance has gone hand in hand with Nazi encouragement
of Balkan fascist movements and diplomatic attempts to l i e
up southeastern Europe with the German-Italian partnership,
the so-called Rome-Berlin axis. Hungary has already yielded
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to Berlin's pressure and become a member of the axis. But the
Balkan states have drawn closer together in the face of Germany's political advance. Yet without the support of the other
great powers they can scarcely hope to withstand German
diplomatic pressure indefinitely. For behind the pressure is the
mighty German war machine.
TRADE WAR8

'

On the other hand, Great Britain has signified her intention of
challenging the advance of German trade in the Balkans. In
December 1938 the British government dramatically marked
southeastern Europe as a commercial battleground, and British
officials declared they would fight the Germans to a finish with .
their own trade weapons. Parliament enthusiastically voted a
"war fund" and the newspapers drummed up support for :
export subsidies and trade credits.
So there is the prospect of a trade war in the Balkans. In
such a war, German diplomacy would have superior military
backing, British diplomacy would have superior financial backing. But Great Britain would be at a disadvantage just the '
same. For though, like Germany, she imports foodstuffs such
as are produced in the Balkans, she can't open her markets to
Balkan products without cutting down her purchases of the
agricultural staples which are produced in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Hence, to a certain extent, at least, she must
choose between being a dominant power in Europe and holding the loyalty of her self-governing Dominions.
Furthermore, certain of the Balkan states may refuse to ally
themselves with Britain in this trade war for fear of Nazi reprisals. Thus, immediately after Hitler's absorption of CzechoSlovakia in March 1939, Rumania made Germany new trade
concessions in the hope that these would permit her to remain
outside the growing Third Reich and keep a certain amou

BUT THE PROBLEM REMAINS

Whatever the eventual results of the trade war in the Balkans
may be, Germany has so far established herself as the dominant
economic power there. But that fact hasn't solved her own
economic problems. For the Balkans produce little cotton,
wool, iron, manganese and mercury and no rubber, tin or
tungsten at all. Consequently Nazi Germany can't withdraw
from the world economy by exploiting the Balkans. True, a
regional economy embracing Germany, the whole of Central
Europe and the Russian Ukraine would approach s e l f - d ciency. For this reason the Nazis are generally thought to have
marked the Ukraine for conquest. But so far the Reich has
been compelled to buy heavily in the world market. And here
the ASK1 mark and direct barter have proved less acceptable
than in the Balkans. Germany has therefore had to buy from
nations that have not bought from her to the same extent.
The result is that she can't be sure of balancing imports with
exports. In 1938, for instance, her trade deficit actually
amounted to more than 400,000,000 marks. This deficit she met
by paying out the foreign exchange she found in Vienna at
the time she annexed Austria. And future deficits she wiH
apparently be able to cover for a year or two with the gold
and foreign exchange she got when she occupied CzechoSlovakia. But what she will use to meet similar deficits after
thee resources are exhausted is an open question. Yet she is
likely to go on having trade deficits as long as she persists in
arming to the teeth and using the threat of her arms to gain
bloodless military victories.
THE HULL TRADE PROGRAM

With Japan forcing her wares on the world market and closing the Chinese market outright by conquest, and with Germany using export subsidies and barter to capture markets not
only in Europe but in Latin America, the United States can
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scarcely afford to remain a disinterested neutral in the strugglet
Yet in several respects her trade-war aims are unlike those of
the two nations we have just considered. In the first place, the
United Seates has all she needs of most of the raw materials
essential to modern industry and therefore doesn't need to
export in order to be able to pay for large imports of them
materials. This is m e of her present peacetime economy and
would be true also in wartime. In the second place, the United
States is a creditor nation, with income from foreign investments and loans. Barring extraordinky debit items, such as
unusually heavy tourist expenditures abroad, she could therefore balance her international accounts even though her
imports were greater than her exports Finally, the United
States has more than half of the world's gold supply: she could
therefore ship gold abroad if her accounts couldn't be balanced
any other way.
ITS AIMS

Now the aim of our present trade program is, primarily, to
open foreign markets to American goods. For an important
part of our economy depends upon exports for its prosperity
and even for its existence. This is true of such agricultural
interests as cotton, tobacco and wheat. It is true also of those
of our industries which are capable of producing far beyond
the purchasing power of the American people. In order to
open foreign markets to our surplus products, Congress in
1934 gave the Executive special powers to negotiate reciprocal
trade treaties. In return for foreign tariff reductions on the
goods we expo- the President and State Department were
authorized to reduce our own tariffs on specified articles by as
much as 50 per cent. This they have done step by step as each
new trade treaty has lowered tariff barriers both at home and
abroad.
Thus the Hull trade program takes account of the elemen-

tary fact that we can't sell goods abroad unless we buy goods
abroad. It therefore marks a reversal of the strong protectionist trend which culminated in the Smoot-Hawley tariff of
1930. Consequently it has been roundly condemned by the
protectionists, and American interests which fear the competition of foreign imports have attempted to restrict the Executive's power to lower tariffs by demanding that each new
trade treaty be submitted to the Senate for ratification. On
the other hand, the producers of export goods, shippers and
international traders and bankers have warmly approved the
Hull program.
THE PROGRAM GETS RESULTS

Whatever the merits of this controversy, the Hull trade treaties have apparently served their purpose of contributing to a
revival of our foreign trade. Thus in 1929 the United States
accounted for about 14 per cent of the world's total international trade. But following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of
1930 and the reprisals which foreign governments took against
it, our share dropped to about 9.5 per cent. Since 1934, however, the United States has regained some of the ground it lost.
In 1937 its share of world trade was I 1.8 per cent. The chart
on page 6 shows the rise of our foreign trade since 1934 in
terms of dollars. Between 1934 and 1937 our exports increased
55 per cent and our imports 65 per cent.
Of course, this rise can't be attributed solely to the reciprocal trade program. And there was in fact a drop in our
foreign trade-as in world trade as a whole-during 1938. But
supporters of the program point to a fact which seems to
justify the trade treaties as a means of stimulating exports.
This fact is that during the fiscal year 1937-38 our exports to
agreement countries were 66 per cent higher than in the years
before the program went into effect, while our exports to nonagreement countries were only 47 per cent higher.
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But we are interested in the Hull trade program not only
as an aid to American exports (and thereby our economic
recovery) but also as a solution to the general problem of
world trade. As we have seen, Germany's trade agreements are
two-way bargains which limit trade to rigid channels and confer no advantages on third parties. The Hull treaties, on the
other hand, follow the traditional American practice of extending to all nations that don't discriminate against us in their
trade practices whatever concessions are made to any one
nation. Because of her discriminatory trade practices, Germany
is on our "blacklist," and her exporters are therefore denied
the benefit of the tariff reductions agreed to in the Hull treaties.
But exporters of all other nations are accorded equal treatment
in our customs offices, whether or not their governments have
signed trade agreements with us.

.

...AND HAS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In short, the Hull trade program is a notable attempt to dredge
the silted channels of world trade. Under it the United States
and nineteen other nations have lowered their tariffs on thousands of articles which enter into international commerce.
These nations include the great powers France and Great
Britain. They do not include any of the totalitarian countries.
(See the map at the center of the book.)
Thus through the Hull trade agreements, as well as through
the tripartite currency pact, the United States, France and
Britain are in fact linked in an informal understanding which
seeks to revive international economic intercourse. This understanding challenges the world trend toward closed national
economies in general and the paralyzing controls and weapons
of the totalitarian rCgimes in particular.
BATRE IN BRAZIL

Important though it is, the Hull trade program is not the only
weapon in the economic armory of the United States. Our

other trade weapons we may examine by turning to the commercial battlefield of Brazil. There the United States and Germany are now engaged in a determined struggle for trade
supremacy. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth
cmtury Great Britain ranked first in Brazil's foreign trade.
During the World War, however, the United States drew
ahead of Britain. And recently Nazi Germany has drawn
ahead of us.
Germany's methods in Brazil an similar to those she employs
in the Balkans. By export subsidies and the use of ASK1 marks,
Germany has increased her sale of manufactures in Brazil and
has obtained a supply of cotton, coffee and frozen meats, as
well as of minerals and other materials essential to German
industry. By this barter arrangement, Brazil secured a market
for her goods. But for these goods she received no currency
she could use to meet payments on her foreign debts, and she
couldn't buy in Germany the raw materials she needed for her
own industries. For these reasons Brazil has broken off trade
relations with the Nazis several times. Each time, however,
Berlin has been abIe to force Brazil to resume trade relations
by threatening to close the German market to Brazilian products altogether. Thus German trade with Brazil has continuedon a precarious footing. Nevertheless German sales rose from
9 per cent of Brazil's total impom in 1932 to 2 3.5 per cent in
I 936 and remained at approximately that level during 1937.
Germany's remarkable trade success in Brazil undoubtedly
c o n t r i i d to the fall in our sales there. In 1932 those sales
amounted to 30 per cent of Brazil's total imports,while in
1936 they had fallen to 2 2 per cent (chart, page 59).

WE G O INTO ACTION

Now let's see what the United States has done to meet this
German challenge. On January I, 1936, the Hd trade agreerlkent with Brazil went into effect. In it the United States
agreed to keep most of Brazil's products on the free list and to

k

cut her duties on Brazil nuts, castor beans and manganese in
Brazil reciprocated by lowering hm tpriffs on a nuf
American
including automobiles, certain machines,
canned fruitsproducts,
and cereals.

.

This was encouraging to American exporters, but it wasn't
enough to offset the advantage their German competitors were
getting from the Reich's export subsidies. So in August 1937
the United States moved against the Nazi traders with the
weapon of finance. In that month the United States govemment agreed to supply Brad with gold to steady her currency
and finance a central bank. In return Brazil pledged herself to
cooperate to protect the principles of the Hull trade agreement
"against outside competition that is diictly subsidized by
governments." At the same time she cancelled a barter deal
with Germany. In reply, the German newspapers violently
attacked the United States for interfering with the "legitimate
expansion" of the commerce of the Reich.

THE TRADE WAR IN B R A Z I L

EACH CRATE RQPRESLNTS 10% OF BRUlL!S IMPORTS (BY VALUe

Finally the United States government prepared to throw
its Export-Import Bank into the fight. This official bank was
set up to lend money to foreign buyers who are not necessarily
in a position to borrow from private sources. In the summer
of 1938 the president of the bank spent several weeks in Brazil,
and early in 1939 Brazil's Foreign Minister came to the United
States to work out an agreement designed to increase trade
beween Brazil and the United States. As reported in March
I 939, the terms of this agreement included a loan of f ~ o , m , m
worth of gold to Brazil, a short term credit of nearly $20,000,ooo to make it possible for Brazil to relax her control over
foreign exchange, and long term credits to finance Brazilian
purchases of railroad equipment and other materials in the
United States. By concluding this agreement our government
has enabled Brazil to resume the interest payments on previous
loans and has also opened up the prospect of a considerable
increase in trade between the two countries.
NECK AND NECK

When this book went to press, the German-American trade
war in Brazil was a very close affair. But there were reasons to
believe that the odds favored the United States. True, Germany's trade strategy contains a sharp element of compulsion,
and Brazil may C O ~ M U to
~ yield to it. Certainly Germany's
threat of putting an embargo on Brazilian products should be
enough to keep the Brazilian market open to German manufactured goods. But this economic weapon is not as powerful
in Brazil as it is in Central Europe, where Nazi military force
is at hand to back it up. Furthermore, the United States is
basically in a monger position than Germany on the Brazilian
battleground. The reasons for this are three: the United
States is Brazil's best market; the United States has for
sale what Brazil needs; and the United States can help Brazil
financially.

-
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To sum up our discussion of trade warfare, we can say that
there are various ways of buying and selling across national
frontiers. These various trade practices fall under two opposing
banners. The first is the banner of economic nationalism,
exemplified in its extreme form by Nazi G e m n y . The second
is the banner of world economy, exemplified, as yet but tentively, by the United States. Germany's trade strategy seeks
to obtain essential supplies and open foreign markets through
two-way, or "bilateral," trade agreements. The result is an
exchange of goods which is undoubtedly better than no trade
at all. But Germany practically obliges the small nations she
buys from to buy from her; thus she dries up their trade in the
world market. But both Germany and the states she makes
exclusive agreements with might do better by shopping around.
This is in fact the chief argnment for an open, world economy.
In contrast with the German policy, the H
ull reciprocal trade
program extends the scope of world economy by lowering
tariff walls generally.
If we were going to judge these two programs from the
point of view of national standards of living, we'd probably
choose the second. But questions of public policy aren't always
decided by the yardstick of human living conditions. For in
some states the national interest is identified with military
power, while in others it is identified with the prosperity of
certain classes or interests without regard for the well-being
of the whole nation. Moreover, some degree of economic
nationalism and economic planning may be justified even in
terms of the general welfare, for it may protect a nation from
the effects of sudden shifts in the economic policies of other
nations, and to some extent it may even cushion the shock of a
general paralysis of world trade, such as might be caused by
depression or by war.
For all these reasons the world appears destined to Iive some

years longer under the shadow of economic nationalism. Yet
the H
ull treaties show that world trade can be partly freed
even in an age of economic nationalism. In fact, for states not
yet committed to the uneconomic ideals of barter and Autarkic,
the present trade program of the United States offers at least
a partial escape from the straight-laced commerce of blocked
currencies and the belt-tightening of self-sdiiciency.

5. Maneuvering for Essential Supplies
So far we've been discussing the great powers' competition for
foreign markets. But economic warfare isn't only a matter of
selling goods abroad. It is also a matter of securing essential
supplies abroad. All the great powers are more or less dependent on imports of raw materials for their industries. And for
some of them the search for raw materials has become a major
problem of foreign policy. In this chapter we shall examine
the raw materials problem, see what the nations have done to
solve it and observe how it d e c t s world economic tensions.
WHAT ARE ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES?

What are these raw materials that the nations must have?
Listed in the order of their industrial importance, the indispensable minerals begin with the energy producers, coal and
oil. Without these fuels a nation's work would have to be done
by men and mules, windmills and waterwheels. Next in importance comes iron, the basic metal of the machine age; then
copper, lead, zinc and aluminum; the precious metals, particularly gold; and the so-called ferro-alloys (metals commonly
alloyed with iron to make steel and other materials), such as
chromite, manganese and nickel.
As you know, the distribution of these minerals in the d
s
surface is exceedingly uneven. N o d America and Europe

&mer acount for almost two-thirds of the world's prdnc-m
.tion-three-fourths if Russh is added. But Asia, txcluding
.Russia. nroduces less than 10~ ecent
r
of the world total, Af&a
WHO HAS THEM

'This uneven distribution is reflected in the relative standing
-of the nations as measured by their production of minerals.
Since we axe concerned here with the industrially important
minerals, we shall borrow the method of rating the powers
devised by Professor Edward Sampson of Princeton. This
method takes account not only of each nation's total output
of minerals but also of the industrial importance of the minerals it produces. It does not,however, take into account either
population or mineral reserves. With these points in mind, let's
have a look at the table on page 65.
By Professor Sampson's reckoning, the United States is at
h the head of the list, with 2 9 per cent of the total world score.
Second is the British Commonwealth of Nations, with nearly
2 1.6 per cent. (This rating should not be confused with that of
the United Kingdom, which is far down on the list, because a
considerable part of the production of the British Commonwealth is controlled not by Britain but by the self-governing
Dominions.) Third on the lin is the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, with just over 9.2 per cent (a rating that may be
-

t

eraI resekes which she hasn't vet emloit&). Greater Gemmnv

These f i p show clearly that when it comes to meamring
them up according to the quantity and importance of the
industrial raw materials they produce, the so-called "great
powers" am not all great by any means. In fact, there's about
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as wide a difference between them as there well could be. Now
you might suppose that this problem could be solved by international trade. Before the World War that was the way it was
solved. Italy, for example, was and is a poor country, with
almost none of the raw materials which are essential for modern industry, such as coal, oil, iron and copper. Yet before the
war she set up light and heavy industries by buying machinery
and raw materials from more favored nations and paying for
them with exports of agricultural products, the money her
emigrants sent back home and foreign loam.
WHY THE PROBLEMQ

Unfortunately, there are certain difficulties in the way of such
a peaceful and sensible solution of the problem of raw materials today. One is that the "have-not" nations are obliged to
buy certain of their mineral supplies from international cartels
which control output and prices. (An international cartel is a
combination of various large producers of a single commodity
or material. Because of its complete or partial monopoly, it is
able to restrict production, fix prices and divide the world
market among its members. The result is that certain raG
materials are available only at unreasonably high prices.)
A second difficulty is the old problem of payment. As we
have seen, nations for the most part can buy only by selling.
And they can sell only to the extent that they succeed in the
trade war we considered in the last chapter. Therefore, since
some countries are bound to be beaten in that trade war, some
countries are also bound not to be able to buy all the imports
they need.
Finally, the progress of industrhliition and the present
armaments race have increased the great powers' dependence
on certain raw materials. Since 1g00 the great powers have
consumed ever increasing amounts of oil, iron, copper and
manganese for ordinary industrial purposes. And recently they
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have had to procure still larger quantities of these raw materials in order to be able to produce the armaments and munitions they are all piling up.
But that isn't all. They also have to look ahead to the problem of how they will obtain supplies of these essential raw
materials in case of war. For in wartime customary sources
may be cut off by blockade or captured by the enemy. The
governments of Europe recall the devastating effect the British
blockade and Germany's submarine warfare had in the 1 s t

war, and their strategists can't guarantee that, if there is another
world war, it will be a Blitzkrieg, or lightning war, either. In
fact, it's more than likely that, after the first swift air attacks,
another general war wodd turn out to be, like the last, a long,
slow process of each side trying to starve the other out and
deprive it of the raw materials it would need to carry on.
Therefore the great powers must face the problem of obtaining foodstuffs and raw materials not only for their immediate
needs but also for a future war of unknown duration.
WHAT IS THE ANSWER*

W e have now made the problem of raw materials sufficiently
difficult to raise the doubt that there can be any solution of it.
There are, however, several partial solutions.
INCREASE PRODUCTION, INVENT SUBSTITUTES

The first is the obvious one of increasing home production to
the limit set by nature and then getting ahead of nature by
producing synthetic materials. Soviet Russia, for instance, has
more than doubled her production of essential industrial raw
materials since 1929 and hasn't yet come anywhere near her
maximum potential output. Germany, on the other hand, has'
been exploiting her mineral resources for centuries, and her
hope now lies in finding ways to use inferior ores and performing miracles in the laboratory. Miracles already performed
include a substitute for rubber ( B m a ) , made of chalk and coal
products, artificial nitrates and synthetic gasoline. Since these
substitutes are made from materials found in Germany, their
invention has made the Nazis less dependent on imports. But
so far no satisfactory substitutes have been invented for most
of the minerals required by modem industry.
STOCK-PILING

A second partial solution of the raw materials problem is
directly related to war. It is to buy the materials that can't be

a blockade or
found at home and store them up for use
other 'emergency. This practice is called stock-piling. Employing it, Japan prepared for her war in China by laying in large
stocks of scrap iron. Germany, too, has laid in supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials.
Stock-piling, however, is difficult to carry out, because the
frenzied preparations for war use up exactly the stocks that
should be stored. Furthermore, stock-piling is costly, and the
countries most in need of raw materials from abroad are those
which are least able to buy beyond their immediate requirements. For while it has been estimated that it would cost the
United States only about $ roo,ooo,ooo to buy a two-year supply of the essential materials she lacks and couldn't produce
synthetically, the other great powers, excluding the U.S.S.R.,
would have to lay in infinitely larger and more varied stocks.
So it's not surprising that the nations aren't indulging in stockpiling to any great extent at the present time.
OTHER MEASURES
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Besides stepping up home production and resorting in some
slight degree to stock-piling, the great powers have made other
moves to prepare themselves for a general war. Many of these
moves constitute partial solutions of the raw materials problem. Thus Great Britain has enlarged her navy to insure uninterrupted communication with her usual overseas sources of
supply in case of war. France has kept a naval lead over Italy
in the Mediterranean in order to make sure that, if war breaks
out, the lines which link her with her empire in Asia and Africa
won't be broken; for she counts not only on the manpower of
her colonies in case of war but also on her empire's considerable mineral resources. Italy is making a systematic search for
raw materials in Ethiopia and has helped Generalissimo Francisco Franco capture the mercury, iron and copper mines of
Spain. She has also increased her grain production and has

restricted imports of foodstuffs, even at the cost of lowering
the Italian standard of living, in order to be in a position to
import larger quantities of iron, coal and ferro-alloys for her
heavy industries. Germany similarly has restricted imports of
certain foodstuffs. At the same time she has increased her
imports of minerals from Central Europe, has put in a strong
bid for Spanish iron and has begun a r p l o i ~ gthe raw materials of Austria and Czecho6lovakia. Japan, too, has prohibited the importation of long lists of "unessential" goods in favor
of the raw materials demanded by her heavy industries; she
has exploited the resources of her puppet, Manchoukuo, and
is now seeking through war a monopoly of China's coal, iron,
tin, tungsten and magnesite.
THE STRUGGLE FOR IRON

Having indicated by these general statements how important
a part raw materials play in power politics today, we can now
be more specific by turning to the nations' competition for
iron. Iron is a stake in modem diplomacy because it is a major
essential for peace and war, and also because geological forces
ages ago distributed it very unevenly beneath the earth's suiface. Like coal, iron is found most abundantly in Europe and
North America. In fact, the presence of iron has been one of
the causes of the industrial supremacy of those regions. In
1936 the United States accounted for almost 30 per cent of the
world's total output of iron ore, Russia and France together
produced about 35 per cent and Sweden, England and a dozen
lesser countries the remaining 36 per cent. But the United
States, Russia and France are the only great powers that produce enough iron to meet their own needs and have some left
over for exports. The others, including Great Britain, are partially or wholly dependent on imports of iron ore. And while
Britain's financial resources enable her to buy freely in the
world market, Japan, Italy and Germany are less fortunate.

For these three "have-not" countries the problem of iron is
therefore an acute one. Lct's see what they have done about it.
WHAT ME JAPANESE HAVE DONE

'

Japan's reserves of iron ore in Japan and Korea are estimated
at about ninety million tons, plus some additional low-grade
ore. But even though these reserves have been exploited energetically, they have failed to meet the needs of Japan's industries. This has been particularly true since the outbreak of the
war in China, for under the stimulus of war Japan's heavy
indusms have developed an enormous appetite for iron. So
Japan has been dependent on large imports from the West.
In order to free herself of this dependence, she has tried to
meet her needs by getting her iron in the East. Her govemment has helped Japanese nationals acquire iron deposits in
British Malaya and prospect for iron in the Netherlands Indies.
Nearer home Japan has tried to find a solution of the raw
materials problem in China.
After her conquest of Manchuria, in 1931-3 2, Japan began
to exploit the iron deposits in her new puppet state of Manchoukuo. And recently she granted a monopoly to the Japan
Iron Manufacturing Company for the exploitation of whatever iron fields she may acquire in the present war in China.
But even if her army meets with complete success in China,
she still won't be able to provide herself with enough iron for
her heavy industries. For the most recent studies of China's
raw materials indicate that her iron deposits aren't extensive
enough to improve Japan's position materially. So in all probability Japan will have to go right on being dependent on the
United States and Europe for a considerable part of her iron.
Of coursc, in peacetime Japan should be able to pay for
imports of necessary raw materials by exporting raw silk,
cotton tgtiles and manufactured goods. But since the beginning of her present war with China she has had to import such

enormous amounts of raw materials, particularly iron ore and
scrap iron, and at the same time cut down her exports so
drastically, that the value of her imports has been higher than
the value of her exports. Consequently she has had to make
frequent shipments of gold to the United States in order to
balance her accounts. But because of her diminishing gold
stores she can't keep this up much longer. What she will do
when her gold is all gone is anyone's guess.
ITALY'S TIGHT SPOT

If Japan has little iron ore, Italy has virtually none. Therefore she is completely dependent on impom, whether for
peace or for war. But already her Ethiopian war and her intervention in Spain have taxed her capacity to pay for imports.
And a general European war would make her problem graver
still. For in such a war Italy couldn't expect to receive any raw
materials from Germany except coal, potash, nitrates and
aluminum. Like her axis partner, Italy would have to import
both iron and oil. But if her enemies bottled up the Mediterranean, the only place she could go for iron ore would be
Spain. And if the British or French fleets patrolled the Mediterranean, she would be cut off from this source, too. Furthermore, as well see in a moment, both Germany and Great
Britain are competing for Spain's iron ore.
Whether Italy's lack of iron and other war materials will
prevent Mussolini from engaging in anything but a limited
war is a question. But it's a sure bet that Italy's shortcomings
would make her a pretty weak partner in any large-scale war
that lasted more than a few months.
THE NOT SO GREAT GREAT RElCH

Bismarck, Germany's "iron chancellor," once remarked that
the great problems of his day would not be decided by parliamentary votes but by blood and iron. And he proceeded to
unify Germany by means of three rapid wars. Since his day
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HOW GERMANY'S IRON ORE IMPORTS HAVE GROWN
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the political importance of iron has increased. But most of
Germany's pre-war iron reserves were in Lorraine, and after
the World War Lorraine was returned to France. Today Gerneeds
many's iron resources aren't enough for her
and would be hopelessly inadequate in case of war.
Even with the addition of - ~ u s t r i aand Czecho-Slovakia,
Germany can't get on without large impom of iron. For
Austria's record production of iron ore is less than two million
used to import a good deal
tons a year, andACzecho-~lovakia
more than she produced. Of course Germany may be able to
change the picture somewhat by determined exploitation of the
Austrian and Czecho-Slovak iron mines. But even so Greater
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Germany's total output of iron ore will still meet only a little
less than one-half of her requirements in these years of armed
truce. So the answer is imports. In 1937 Germany's imports of
iron ore reached the enormous total of 22,724000 tons. And as
long as she continues to arm at the present pace she will Plmwt
certainly have to continue to import at least fifteen to eighteen
million tons a year.
Now let's see where Germany gets her iron ore, who competes with her for it and what her chances of keeping her
heavy industries fed with this essential raw material would be
in case of war.
WHERE THERE'S A WILL

. ..

Nearest at hand are the iron mines of Lorraine, France's richest World War prize. We're so accustomed to think of France
and Germany as i n v e t e enemies that it's very surprising
to learn that the two countries have cooperated amiably in
economic matters ever since 1925. But they have. For the
German iron and steel industry has been getting a considerable
part of its iron ore from the mines of Lorraine; and the French
steel industry has been supplied from the coal mines of the
Ruhr valley and the Saar. In fact, for the past dozen years the
iron and steel industries of France and Germany have joined
together and, with Belgian producers, have operated a cartel
designed to keep up the prices of their products.
This cooperation has continued into the age of Hitler.
Recently the French and German governments made a highly
sigmficant barter deal. By its terms, Germany is assured a steady
supply of French iron ore in return for German coke. So we
can say that the Reich's imports of iron ore from France-28
per cent of her total impom of iron ore in 1937-cause no
econmic tensions. But of course it's obvious that in case of a
FmncdGerman war Germany's heavy industries would be
s e d y handicapped unless the Nazi war machine could crash

the strong French defenses and recapture the iron mines of
Lorraine.
L

WHY SWEDEN FOUOWS THE MIDDLE WAY
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But Gemany has another source of supply-Sweden. In fact
Sweden has long been Germany's chief source of iron ore. In
1933 German imports of Swedish ore stood at three million
tons. But as the Nazi regime turned to rearmament, this figure
rose rapidly. Since 1935 Germany has bought eight or nine
million tons of Swedish ore annually-nearly half her total iron
ore imports. This rapid increase in Germany's demand for her
iron ore put Sweden on the spot. Some years before, in an
effort to conserve her own supply in case of need, Sweden
had set an annual average limit of 9,000,000 tons on the quantity of iron ore that could be expomd. At that time Great
Britain was buying only about an eighth of her iron ore
imports in Sweden. But with the speeding up of armamentbuilding that came after 1935, Britain followed Germany's
example and turned to Sweden for increased supplies of iron.
As a result her imports of Swedish iron ore rose rapidly: by
1937 they had reached the figure of 1,645,000 tons.
Consequently, at this point the Swedish government was
faced with the choice of refusii to let Great Britain increase
her purchases of iron ore any further, cutting down the cus;tomary exports to Germany and transferring the Merence to
Britain, or raising the legal limit on total exports. It chose the
last alternative: in 1938 it raised the legal limit on iron exporn
from nine to fifteen million tons a year. In this way Sweden
made it possible for Great Britain (and other countries) to buy
more of her iron ore while at the same time she avoided run' ning the risk of antagonizing Nazi Germany by cutting down
her share of it.
Thus Sweden solved, at lrasFfor the time being, a peacetime
problem of raw materials. Thus, toq she decreased the likeli-'

hood of international tension over her ores. In case of war,
however, she would be in a pretty tough spot. For if Germany
were cut off from other sources of iron, she would undoubtedly demand the whole output of the Swedish mines. And,
whether or not she made the same demand, Great Britain
would make it one of her war aims to prevent the Swedish ore
from getting to Germany. Furthermore, both powers could put
the screws on Sweden, for in wartime Germany's threat would
be to bombard Sweden's Baltic ports, Britain's to stop Sweden's
foreign trade in the North Sea.
Here, then, is an explanation of Sweden's "middle way" in
international affairs: because she can't afford to alienate either
Germany or Britain, willy-nilly she must tread a wary course
between them.

I

1
1

FRANC0 FOOLS THE FUEHRER

Spain has been one of Europe's lesser producers of iron ore,
her annual output between 1931 and 1935 having averaged
just over two and one-quarter million tons. The Spanish mines
are largely owned by British interests, and before the outbreak
of the Spanish civil war, in the summer of 1936, half of t h e i ~
output was regularly shipped to England. But Generalissimo
Francisco Franco's rebellion offered Germany as well as Italy
a new source of raw materials. In June r 937, when Franco
had just conquered Spain's richest iron deposits, near Bilbao,
Hitler declared that Spanish iron ore was in fact "the reason we
want a Nationalist government in Spain."
At that time Franco was deeply indebted to the German
government for goods and services, and Berlin had every reason
to expect to get Bilbao's entire output of iron in return. (The
fact that the mines were owned by British stockholders hardly
stood in the way, for Franco had assumed control over all
production in the conquered territory.) But Franco was in
urgent need of foreign currency, and so Great Britain, with
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'In wartime Germany's threat would be to bombard Sweden'r Baltlo
ports, Britain'r to atop Sweden's foreign trade In the North Sea.'

her superior financial resources, was in a better bargaining
position than Germany. W e can't yet be certain that this is
the whole story, but at any rate during the following months
the bulk of Bilbao's iron shipments went not to Germany but
to Britain. And it seems likely that the British will continue
to compete with Germany for Spanish ores now the war is
over. In fact it's possible that the weapon of finance will decide
who is the real winner during the period of Spanish reconstruction.
STYMIED?

From this rapid survey it should be clear that whatever Nazi
Germany has done to solve the problem of blood, she hasn't
yet solved the problem of iron. In peacetime this fact need not
n e c d y have serious consequences for her. But in wartime it
almost certainly would. For in wartime Germany's ability to
continue getting Swedish iron ore would be problematical,
whiIe her French and Spanish sources would almost certainly
be cut off. German industry would then rapidly exhaust its
own supplies, and the German war machine would be slowed
up or stopped. At the same time, Germany's losses would be
France and Britain's gains. In fact, Germany's failure to achieve
or even approach self-su6ciency in iron would be one of her
fundamental weaknesses in case of war. But whether this fact
will contribute to European peace by preventing war or only
become a factor in European politics after war has begun
nobody can say.
CUT AND DEAL AGAIN?

We have now seen that there is great inequality in the
possession and production of raw materials, ranging from the
extreme poverty of Italy to the vast wealth of the United
States. This inequality is widely believed to be a possible
cause of war. Consequently it has been urged that, in order
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to prevent war, the world should be redivided to give the
"have-not" countries a "fair share" of the available mineral
wealth. For then, so the argument goes, those countries would
no longer be compelled to resort to aggression to gain markets
and sources of raw materials.
Of course colonies are the only parts of the world that
could be readily re-dealt among the great powers. But redealing colonies won't solve anyone's raw materials problem. For
less than five per cent of the world's total output of important
raw materials comes from colonial areas. The rest is produced
in sovereign territory which could be assigned to the needy
nations only by such settlements as were made at Paris in 1919
and at Munich in 1938. (Incidentally the Nazis' attachment to
the pre-war German colonies is a matter of sentiment and
power politics rather than economics. For Germany's old
African lands were a constant drain on the imperial treasury.)
OR REVIVE WORLD TRADE8

. . Impartial studies have

therefore concluded that the solution
of the raw materials problem lies in trade rather than in territorial readjustments. These studies point out that every essential raw material is now on sale in the world market. They
point out also that although some raw materials, such as
aluminum, are priced high by international cartels, others, such
.as English coal, are "dumped" abroad at prices which are
actually below domestic prices.
THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM
So from the point of view of the "have-not" countries the

problem is how to pay for raw materials. For, as we have
:repeatedly said, Germany, Italy and Japan have very little
.gold and foreign currency. And nine-tenths of the lesser
nations are in the same boat. Their purchases of raw materials
abroad are therefore limited to what they can pay for by
exports. And the volume of their exports depends to a large

extent on how successful they are in the trade war we have
discussed.
TWO SOLUTIONS

Yet there are two. ways whereby these "have-not7' countries
can increase their exports (and therefore their ability to import
more raw materials) without resorting to cutthroat competition or conquest. The first is the expedient of large-scale
barter; the second is a trade treaty with the United States, or
commercial agreements with other countries.
BARTER

Barter, of course, is a crude means of exchanging goods. But it
has the prime merit of raising no foreign exchange problems
at all. And, embodied in long-term agreements, it guarantees
a steady supply of essential materials or commodities. Furthermore, barter, like trade in general, cuts across political differences. Thus, despite the fact that, politically, they are poles
apart, Mexico has shipped her oil to Germany and France
has supplied the Reich with iron ore in exchange for German
coke. Even Soviet Russia's great wealth of raw materials is to.
some extent available to the "have-not" countries through
barter deals. Between 1935 and I 937, Russia supplied Germany
with from three hundred to four hundred thousand tons of
oil yearly. And early in 1939 Russia and Italy concluded a
barter agreement by which Italy will get essential raw materials from the Ukraine in exchange for manufactured goods.
TRADE TREATIES

A second means by which the "have-not7' countries could
obtain supplies of essential materials would be to make trade
treaties with the United States and commercial agreements
with other nations. For, as we've already seen, though it rules
out direct barter deals, by lowering tariffs the Hull trade pro-
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gram makes it possible for the buyers of our goods to sell
more of their goods to us. So by negotiating a Hull trade
agreement with us a "have-not" country would probably
be able to increase its sales in the United States enough to
enable it to cover purchases of the raw materials it has to
import. If Italy, for instance, had signed a trade agreement
instead of conquering Ethiopia, the Italian standard of living
might not require the belt-tightening it does today.
Of course the "have-not" countries couldn't avail themselves of this means of acquiring raw materials today without
first changing their foreign policies. For since the Hull trade
program reflects American opinion on the foreign policies of
other countries, it would be out of the question for our government to consider a trade agreement with Germany, Italy or
Japan while those countries are pursuing expansion programs
that shock American opinion and injure our national interest.
Nevertheless the Hull trade program remains a standing opportunity to any "have-not" country that is sutticiently interested
in solving its economic problems to be willing to give up its
warlike methods. Meanwhile, of course, there are other nations
than the United States which have been willing to make commercial agreements with the "have-not7' countries if properly
approached. Great Britain was in fact on the point of negotiating a trade agreement with Germany when Hitler invaded
Czecho-Slovakia. But the shock of his military action brought
the plan to an abrupt end, at least for the time being.
THE PROBLEM IS A WAR PROBLEM

r

As a final comment on the raw materials question we may say
that the "have-not" countries can now satisfy their peacetime
requirements of iron and oil for the most part on their own
terms. What they find difficult is importing the raw materials
required for their vast armaments programs and making themselves self-sufficient in case of another world war. They can

therefore take the first step toward solving their raw materials
problem themselves-by giving up war as an instrument of
foreign policy and calling a halt to the armaments race.

6. Economic War and Real War
W e are now near the end of our story. We have seen how
economic nationalism has arisen at the expense of a world
economy. We have noted the financial inequality which divides
the great powers into hostile camps of "haves" and "havenots." And we have examined the weapons and tactics of these
powers in their war for markets and raw materials.
But our hardest job remains to be done: it is to discover the
relation between the economic war we have been discussing
and the real war the world is kept in constant fear of. The job
is a hard one because it's almost impossible to state exactly
how big a part economic forces play in causing war. Historians
disagree as to how much economic factors were to blame for
the last world war. So what are we to say about the economic
causes of the next world war?
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THE COSTS OF WAR

W e may rule out at once the idea that governments calmly
calculate the costs of war and the economic gains they expect
to get out of it, and then choose war or peace accordingly.
If they did, this would be a very peaceful world. For it's now
recognized that the material ga&-from war are almost invariably offset, and offset many times over, by the cost, win or
lose. Even Mussolini's minor war against the Ethiopian tribesmen cost Italy more than the new colony can reasonably be
expected to pay back in decades of systematic exploitation. In
fact, quin apart from the costs of the conquest, it's possible
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that Ethiopia will remain a liability and a drain on the Italian
treasury, as Germany's former African colonies were on her.
THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE CAUSES OF WAR
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Uneconomic as war is, there are, however, economic factors
among its causes. For back of the sharp international crises
'which sometimes end in war is the clash of conflicting national
aims. Some of these aims may be primarily economic, like
securing fishing rights in foreign waters or helping nationals
to make profitable foreign investments and bag new foreign
markets. others, like prestige, security and power, may contain less obvious economic elements. Perhaps we can make
these economic elements clearer by looking for a moment at
power as a factor in national policy.
POWER-END

OR MEANSO

Every great nation is shaping its policies today in such a way
as to increase its power. Once achieved, this power may be
turned to the advantage of manufacturers or bankers or farmers or workers or a party in colored shirts or a decadent aristocracy. Conceivably it may even be turned to %headvantage of
the whole nation. So we can think of power as a means to
various ends. But means have a way of becoming ends in themselves. And some countries seem to be seeking power as an end
in itself today.
In any case, we measure power in international relations by
its bargaining effectiveness in diplomacy. And this in turn is
generally determined by the crude yardstick of military might.
Military might is a product of various factors, as a jingle
popular in England in the time of Queen Victoria suggests:
We don't want to light;
But, by jingo, i f 'we do,

We've got the ships,
We've got the men,
We've gut the money, too.

Of course, to bring this jingle up to date we'd have to add
a few military items like tanks and bombing planes. But we'd
also have to add industrial plant and technology, skilled workers, essential fuels and basic minerals. For today military might,
and therefore power, depend as never before on industrial
oumut.
1; other words, if a nation aims to build up its military
might it has to take economic factors into account. As a matter
of fact, whatever a nation's aims are nowadays, they are bound
to be linked up with economic considerations.
ECONOMIC WAR AND REAL WAR

For this reason the clash of national aims which leads to war
is tied up with the economic warfare we have been discussing
in this book. For the race for power is itself one of the causes
of war, and the race is a matter of economic armament as well
as military armament. A nation lacking capital, markets and
raw materials is forced to choose between seeking these components of power or dropping out of the race. If it chooses the
former course it plunges into international economic warfare
carried on without rules, sidelines or umpires. Such a worldwide brawl naturally heightens international tensions and thus
brings real war nearer. At the same time, the nearer war comes
the greater becomes the powers' need of war supplies, and
thus the fiercer the economic competition. W e may therefore
think of economic war and real war as being joined in a
vicious circle.
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN WAR

This intimate relationship between economic war and real war
becomes clearer when war actually occurs. For then the economic war is immediately merged in the larger struggle. Look,
for example, at Japan's current war in China. There trading
centers, factories and mines have been marked as military
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'We may therefore think of economic war and real war
as being Joined in a vicious circle.'

objectives. Japanese business men have followed the troops
and have all but chased stretcher-bearers in their search for
customers. The exploitation of China's mineral resources has
already begun. And, when the war ends, the peace settlement,
if it is like that drawn up at Paris after the World War, will

dispose of men, land, markets, industrial plant, gold, foreign
currency and raw materials alike.
Now before we ask if anything can be done to break this
vicious circle of economic war and real war, we ought to point
out emphatically that economic transactions between nations
are not all sinister and war-making. In fact for the most part
nations carry on business with each other even today in a dull
and orderly manner and without endangering the world's peace
at all. As we have seen, even nations that are thought of as
sworn enemies trade with each other without unpleasantness
at the frontier.
BREAKING THE CIRCLE
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Now let's look into the possibility of breaking the vicious 1
circle in which economic war and real war are joined. If we
could make real war less likely, the economic war would
unquestionably be less fiercely fought, for the great powers
would be less harassed by the problem of getting raw
materials for armaments and less concerned with making themselves self-sufficient in case they are faced by a blockade or an
embargo. And if, on the other hand, we could ease the tensions of the economic struggle, international friction and ill
will would diminish and the danger of war would recede.
T W O PROPOSALS

We can get into this subject by considering two well known
proposals. The first of these proposals is that war should be
prevented or stopped by means of economic weapons like the
boycott and the embargo. The second is that the economic
war should be eased by such measures as opening markets and
making raw materials more easily obtainable. We'll find at once
that neither of these proposals can be seriously considered
without taking the foreign policy of the United States into
account.

PREVENTING WAR BY ECONOMlC MEASURES

The prevention of war by economic measures is an old idea,
but it was not until 1919, when the Covenant of the League of
Nations provided for "economic sanctions" against war, d-mt
it seemed to be on the way to practical application. The
League's sanctions were designed to cut off an aggressor state
from all foreign loans, markets and supplies. Since no nation
could carry on a war on its own resources for very long, the
League's provisions for a general embargo were expected to
prevent war by greatly increasing the risks involved in it. If, in
spite of those risks, war occurred, an embargo against the
aggressor was expected to bring it to a speedy end.
But economic measures can't be effective in restraining
nations from resorting to war or in stopping a war once begun
unless all the exporting countries agree to join in applying
them. Furthermore, since an ernbargo is considered a drastic
measure and may provoke equally drastic counter-measures, the
nations resorting to it must be prepared to back it up by force
if necessary. When the League attempted to save Ethiopia
from being conquered by Italy, neither of these important
conditions was fulfilled and Italy won the war on oil supplied
by the United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain.
WHERE WE COME IN

Since an embargo against an aggressor state would be almost
certain to fail without our cooperation, the policy of the
United States is of paramount importance to the success of
economic sanctions. But our policy has lbem to avoid commitments to act with other nations against war. Joining the
League would have committed us to cooperate with other
League st@s in applying economic sanctions to prevent war;
but we declined to accept membership or the responsibiIities
of membership. Thus, from the first, uncertainty as to what
we would do in case it imposed an embargo on an aggressor
has weakened-the League as an instrument for preventing war.

THE NEUTRALITY ACT

This uncertainty has been largely removed by our present
Neutrality Act, for in that act we have abandoned some of the
old "neutral rights" under which we claimed the privilege of
lending money to belligerents and trading with them. Yet the
Neutrality Act was framed not to prevent war but to keep the
United States out of war. T o do this, the act puts all belligerents in the same boat, cuts them off from American loans and
munitions and gives the President the authority to forbid them
to buy from us such war supplies as chemicals, iron, oil, etc.,
unless they can pay cash for them and carry them away in
other than American ships.
CASH-AND-CARRY

This so-called "cash-and-carry" provision would aid some
belligerents more than others. In case of a general European
war, for instance, Great Britain and France would be able to
buy whatever they needed in the United States short of
munitions and instruments of war. For they have financial
resources, merchant ships and seapower. But Germany and
Italy would be able to buy much less here even if the British
fleet allowed their overseas trade to continue. The cash-andcarry provision therefore seems designed to aid the European
democracies in case of war.
In the Far East, however, the act, if it had been invoked,
would have aided Japan rather than China. For that reason it
has never been proclaimed in effect there. If it had been in
effect, the sale of munitions to both belligerents would have
been cut off, but Japan could have gone on buying essential
war materials other than munitions under the act's cash-andcarry provision. For Japan has paid cash for her imports of
American scrap iron and oil and has carried them
in her
own ships. China, on the other hand, would have been unable
to obtain supplies from us for lack of ships and seapower.
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Furthermore our recent loan to the Chinese government
couldn't have been made if the act had been invoked.
REVISE THE NEUTRALITY ACT?
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Under the Neutrality Act, therefore, the economic resources
of the United States would in son^ instances aid resistance to
aggression, in others aggression itself. For this reason it has
been urged that the act should be revised to permit our policy
to distinguish between aggressors and the victims of aggression.
President Roosevelt has advocated an "economic quarantine"
of nations violating treaties and frontiers, and the State
Department has recently taken a short step in this direction by
getting all American manufacturers of bombing planes to agree
not to deal with warring powers that bomb civilian populations.
BOYCOTTS AND EMBARGO&
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But, as we've already said, economic measures can't be effectively employed agairist war unless all the exporting nations
cooperate. Thus, also, boycorn generally fail because they seldom enlist more than a fraction of the buying public. Of
course the embargo is a stronger weapon than the boycott
because it is enforced by law. But just as the success of the
boycott depends on the general cooperation of individuals, so
the success of embargoes depends on the general cooperation
of nations.
Now, as we've seen, any power employing economic weapons against war must be prepared to accept the risk of war
itself. An Anglo-American embargo against Japan might well
have ended the war in China, for Japan's advance has depended
on imports of oil and iron. But Japan would undoubtedly have
construed the embargo as a war measure and would have
replied to it by taking reprisals against the nations which
applied it. Reprisals might have included seizing American and
British properties in China and Japan and capturing Hong

Kong and the Philippines. Thus the use of economic weapons
against war requires not only cooperation in depriving aggmsor states of war supplies but also cooperation in meeting the
consequences, even if this means war itself.
WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS?

From this it seems clear that the key to successful economic
action against wars of aggmsion is international cooperation
of a very fundamental sort. But this sort of cooperation is
cult to achieve. For whenever war or threat of war occurs,
each nation looks the situation over and, if its own immediate
interests aren't vitally affected, does nothing. Or it may do as
the United States has done during the present war in Chinawrite diplomatic protests to the aggressor state and sell
munitions, iron and oil to both sides! Therefore whenever
cooperative action might prevent or end a war, at least one of
the great powers is almost certain to be a hold-out and spoil
the show by permitting exports for the war machines.
Yet this sort of international cooperation must be achieved
if the world is to be organized for peace. And it's possible that
the diplomatic union of Germany, Italy and Japan, and their
steady advance by war and threat of war, may still force the
world to unite in self-defense. But in this case we shall probably
be faced with war itself, and not the use of economic weapons
to prevent or stop war.
Therefore we must conclude that there is no immediate
prospect of using embargoes to break the vicious circle joining
economic war and real war.
EASING ECONOMJC TENSIONS

Let's turn now to the second proposal, namely, lessening the
danger of war by easing world economic tensions. As we've
h e a d y seen, these tensions arix from problems of currency,
the debtor-creditor relationship between nations, trade barriers
and the unequal control of raw materials.

STABILIZE CURRENCIES, REDISTRIBUTE GOLD?

We have seen that the nations' currencies riseand fall, but not
with the regularity of the tides, so that no one knows from one
day to the next what his own currency will be worth abroad.
This of course makes business transactions across national
frontiers very difiicult. The tripartite agreement, signed by the
United States, Great Britain and France, was a notable attempt
to lessen the chaos in international currency relations. And the
agreement is open to signatures. But if currencies are to be
stabilized, something must be done to redistribute the world's
gold supply. For, as we said before, the United States has some
sixty per cent of the world's gold, most of it salted harmlessly
away in Federal storage vaults in Kentucky. And every month
millions more pour in as the remaining democracies are driven
nearer the rigid controls of totalitarian finance.
The simp&t way to pump this gold back into international
circulation would be to build up the debit items in our international accounts. This could 'be done by admitting more
foreign goods or by exporting capital in the form of loans and
investments. In either case, we'd then have to balance our
international accounts by shipping out gold which is useless
to us but is urgently needed by some fifty other nations.
LET DEBTORS PAY THEIR DEBTS8

Our international balance of payments comes up again when
we consider debtor-creditor relationships. Most of the great
powers owe us considerable sum of money but pay us nothing, and it's news when a small state like Finland pays installments on its debt to us. Now there's something very strange
about this, for many of the world's intergovernmental debts
are being paid regularly in part or in full. Even Nazi Germany
is giving her European creditors parrial satisfaction. The
explanation of our inability to collect from our debtors is not
that foreign governments choose to discriminate against us by

paying every creditor but Uncle Sam. Generally speaking, the
explanation is that our tariff walls make it d S c u l t or impossible
for them to pay us.
This was the lesson of our third chapter. Most debtor nations
can pay their debts only by exporting more than they import.
Conversely, creditor nations can collect their debts only by importing more than they export. Great Britain learned this principle some years ago, and her debtors default less frequently
than ours. For by importing a billion or so more dollars worth
of goods every year than she sells abroad Britain makes pounds
available to her debtors to pay her with.
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LOWER OUR TARIFF WALL?

The United States, on the other hand, thinks in terms of a
"favorable" balance of trade or, in other words, of exporting
more than she imports. But, as a financial writer in The New
York Times recently suggested, the United States and the
world would both benefit if we had an "unfavorable" balance
of trade. ''Tradi~ioo,allythis country looks upon a favorable
balance of trade as a sign of good business," he wrote. "If an
excess of imports appears, there are rumblings, clamor that
something be done about it. That feeling dates from the prewar days when the United States was a debtor nation. Then
favorable balances were essential. Now they are almost suicidal.
It is not merely a question of allowing Europe to pay its war
debts to us by our accepting Europe's goods. It goes much
deeper. It is now a question of giving Europe gold, so that
European nations may have more money t o trade with each
other, and more money to trade with us."
Of course, the Hull trade agreements have lowered our tariff
walls section by section, and for a time they promised to
increase our imports at least as rapidly as our exports. But
recently a "favorable" balance of trade has broughr more gold
into the country. During 1938 our exports were worth a billion
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dollars more than our imports, and io!d came to us from abroad
(part of it in panic flight from jittexy Europe) to the tune of
nearly one and three-quarter billion dollars. Therefore, to fit
our economy to our present world position as a creditor nation,
we may have to lower our tarifF barriers even further than the
Hull treaties have. Opening our market would probably not
enable us to collect the war.&may as well be considmd dead and buried; <Buo$ @.help
to salvage a-part of
our foreign investments, and it would also put new foreign
loans on a sounder basis.
WHAT THIS WOULD DO

Further lowering of our tar8 walls would thus ease world
economic tensions, for it would lead to a redistribution of our
vast stores of gold now lying idle, it would make new foreign
loans possible that could be repaid in goods, and it would make
our raw materials available to nations that can't now buy them
but could then buy them by increasing their exports to us.
So opening the American market would contribute to the
solution of the world's most diftlcult economic problems. But
what effect would this have on the, United States? If our tariff
wall were entirely demolished, many American interests would
undoubtedly suffer and some would be put out of business
altogether by the competition of foreign goods. But if our tariffs were lowered piecemeal, each reduction could be designed
to produce more gains than losses. The losses might of course
include the disappearance of certain inefficient or uneconomic
industries which have been kept alive by high tariffs. But,
thanks to their better machinery and their lower transportation
costs, most American producers would be able to meet fore@
competition. Moreover, the competition of foreign goods
would lower prices, particularly the prices of goods produced
by American monopolies, and so would benefit the consuming
public. Furthermore, many American producers would find

new foreign markets, for htions exporting more to the United
States could buy more from us.
The difficult subjezt of tariffs could be continued, pro and
con, indefiaiaely. But this is perhaps enough to suggest drot our
rPriff walls could be lowered still further and in such a way
as to contribute to a lessening of world economic tensions
and to serve our own national interest at the same time.
EQUAL ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS9

The United States therefore has it in its power to make a
major contribution to world economic peace. But the nations
in greatest need of our markets, gold and raw materials have
alienated American opinion and challenged American interests
by their policies of repression and violence at home and expansion by threats and war abroad. To offer economic appeasement m these nations is therefore scarcely a timely proposal

I
I

I

I

AMERICA MUST CHOOSE

In the meantime, it's clear that our own economic position in
the world is being affected by the trend toward exclusive,
regional economies in Europe and Asia. East of France and
west of Russia, Nazi Germany is building a regional economy
which may be able to get on without any business relations
with the United States at all. The Soviet Union is virtually
a self-contained economic unit, second only to the United
States in its natural resources. And Eastern Asia is being
rapidly closed to American interests by Japan's war in Chins
HOE OUR OWN ROW8

In this situation, there are three practical courses for the
United States to follow. The first is to take particular account
of the possibilities of the world's richest market, namely the
United States. A large part of our population is undernourished,
poorly clothed and badly housed. If we can bring American

-

production into line with human needs in the u ~ t e dStates,
and if we can find a way OD increpsc the purchasing power
of our "submerged third" enough to buy the increased output
of our mills and factories, perhaps we won't have to worry
particularly about losing our fordgn markets.
CULTIVATE PAN-AMERICA?

The second course is to build up a vast regional economy
embracing North, Central and South America. In contrast
to the regional economies now being set up by intimidation
and force in Europe and Asia, an all-American economy could
be established on the basis of mutual advantage and consent.
In fact, a promising basis for inter-American cooperation has
already been provided by our Good Neighbor policy. But it's
obvious that this policy can't be defined in Washington, Wall
Street or Pittsburgh done* T o become the working basis for
relations throughout the Americas, the Good Neighbor policy
will have to be defined jointly by importers as well as exporters, debtors as well as creditors. Defining the Good Neighbor
relationship is a job for the Pan-American conferences and for
such agencies as the confemces set up. Thc conference held
at Lima,Peru, in December 1938 was marked by the cmtcmmy
oratory. But behind the scenes &ere was evidmce of a general
desire to bring the policies of the various nations of North and
South America into harmony* If we could capitalize on that
desire and create a regional economy in the W
estern Hemisphere, maybe we could let the rest of the d d go hang.
FIGHT ON THE WORU) FRONT

Finally, there is the wide warld, and here the United States
hasn't by any means conceded the victory to the totalitarian
rbgimes. The Hull aadt progtam is a dramatic challenge to
trade practices like subsidy, intimidation and conquest, and our
map indicates that the United States isn't alone in making this

challenge, either. For nineteen other nations, including France
and Great Britain, have so far joined the side of freer economic
relations.
Such an extension of economic relations in the direction of
an open, international economy will perhaps contribute to at
least a partial solution of the problems we have considered in
this book. And even a partial solution of those problems may
suggest a means of blunting the sharpness of economic warfare and thus perhaps even slowing the march on the road to
real war.
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